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IN THE SUPREME C·OUR T
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALICE M. DONAHUE, BARBARA
DONAHUE, and CONSTANCE
DONAHUE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.-

Case

WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES
DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION, INTERMOUNTAIN
THEATRES, INC., ARCH E.
OVERMAN and C. E. OVERMAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 7965

Appellant's Brief
This appeal concerns itself primarily with Sections
76-4-8 and 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as applied to
certain facts which are, in the main, undisputed.
The case itself has had a career in the courts, Federal and State, which manifests the uncertainty of understanding and diversity of views of those- who have had
1
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the responsibility for decision, and in the trial court a
complete conflict as to meaning of the applicable law between the laws as set forth in the instructions to the jury
and as set forth in the Declaratory Judgment. In view
of the importance of the subject matter involved a more
complete statement of the facts, pleadings, instructions,
requested and given, and history of the case is required.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
HISTORY OF THE CASE
This case, originally filed in the State court, was
removed to the Federal Court by defendants (R. 10);
where the deposition of plaintiff Alice M. Donahue was
taken (R. 64), and certain interrogatories were propoun~ed by each party to the other to which answers
were made (R. 33, 78); an amended complaint was :filed
by plaintiff (R. 47) ; a motion for summary judgment
was made by defendants; was granted by the District
Court (R. 26); an appeal was taken therefrom by plaintiffs to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit;
after several hearings in the Circuit Court of Appeals
the lower court was reversed by three to two decision
(R. 24); mandate filed in the District Court (R. 25); and
then by appropriate proceedings under the Federal Rules
and by stipulation and agreement by the parties remanded to the State Court (R. 61); preliminary proceedings had before the State court (Judge Martin Larson)
with reference to defenses interposed by defendants (R.
63); plaintiffs moved for permission to file an amend2
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ment to their complaint (R. 67) .which was denied (R. 70);
and thereafter the .case 'vas tried before the Honorable
Ray VanCott, Jr., and jury and a verdict of no cause of
a"~tion entered (R. 173).
STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff Alice M. Donahue is the widow (R. 206)
and the other plaintiffs are the daughters (R. 213) of
Jack Donahue, who was during his lifetime a famous
dancer and comedian (R. 214). He was also the author
of several articles (R. 2i4), a book (R. 215) and one
play. He appeared on the American stage in vaudeville
and in several plays in which he was starred or co-starred
(R. 218-223). Among other plays he appeared as co-star
with Marilyn Miller in two plays (R. 220). He died on
the 16th day of October, 1930, leaving a widow and three
daughters, plaintiffs, and one daughter, Alma, who has
died since this action was commenced (R. 194). Plaintiffs
are all residents of the State of California. They have
never lived in Utah.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., a corporation, not
served with process in this action, made a motion picture,
''Look for the Silver Lining'', in which Ray Bolger purported to impersonate and use the name of Jack Donahue
(R. 226) and June Haver purported to impersonate and
use the name of Marilyn Miller (R. 226). The play
centered around what was· purported to be the lives of
Jack Donahue and Marilyn Miller and featuring what
was purported to be scenes, songs and dances in which
Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue were supposed to have
3
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been the central figures during their lives (R. 226-227).
Excepting for the fact that Jack Donahue was a famous
actor, dancer and entertainer and did, during his lifetime,
appear and co-star with Marilyn Miller in the two plays
''Rosalie'' and ''Sonny'', the portrayal of Jack Donahue
in the motion picture ''Look for the Silver Lining'' was
purely fictional and untrue to fact (R. 229). The portrayal of Jack Donahue's personality by the actor Ray
Bolger was not an accurate portrayal of Jack Donahue's
personal characteristics ( R. 229-30) and in one scene
Jack Donahue is shown as having met Marilyn Miller in
London and having shown her a picture of his child in
1913 or 1914, a time prior to his marriage and the birth
of either of his daughters (R. 231). Jack Donahue was
never married to anyone but plaintiff Alice M. Donahue.
The motion picture, ''Look for the Silver Lining'', was
objectionable to plaintiffs (R. 234) and caused them personal distress, embarrassment and humiliation (R. 235,
340, 355).
Plaintiffs never consented in writing or otherwise
to the use of the name, portrait or picture of Jack Donahue by Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., or any of the
defendants (R. 95).
The plaintiffs saw the picture at Warner Bros.
Theatre in California in March of 1949 (R. 245). They
never saw it in Utah (R. 225).
Mr. Preston D. Richards, then attorney for plaintiffs,
wrote to defendants respectively on the 16th day of
4
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August, 1949, and the 16th day of September, 1949, protesting against the exhibition of the picture in Utah and
advising them of the law prohibiting the same. See Exhibits G, H, I, J and K.
The picture was distributed by defendant Warner
Bros. Pictures Dist. Corporation to many exhibitors in
Utah and was exhibited by those theatres, including the
defendant Intermountain Theaters and Overmans, between the 14th day of September, 1949 and the 1st day
of August, 1950. See Exhibit "A" as to dates, times of
showing, period of run and terms of rental.
The defendants admit and allege they intend to
exhibit and re-exhibit the picture in the future.
It was stipulated that the motion picture shown in
Utah was the same as the one that plaintiffs had seen
in California ( R. 225).
Plaintiffs testified that they were embarrassed,
humiliated and distressed by the exhibition in Utah (R.
248, 345, 356).
The evidence offered by defendants consisted solely
of scrapbooks of the memento's of Jack Donahue's career,
the showing of the picture ''Look for the Silver Lining''
to the court and jury and the testimony offered over the
timely objections of plaintiffs by educators as to the
purported educational and instructive possibilities of
the picture.
5
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The trial. court, in its instructions, left up to the
jury only the issue of damages for injury to the feelings
of plaintiffs and the following:
(1) Whether the motion picture "Look for the Silver Lining'' is essentially informative and educational;
and
(2) Whether the exhibition of the motion picture
was for purposes of trade.
After a verdict of no cause of action was entered,
the trial court considered defendants' claim for Declaratory Judgment and entered the following Judgment:
"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
'' 1. The plaintiffs have no right as against
the defendant Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing
Corporation, or as against the defendant Intermountain Theatres, Inc., or as against the defendants Arch E. and C. E. Overman, to recover damages for injury to their feelings or sensibilities by
reason of either past or future distributions or
exhibitions of the motion picture 'Look for the
Silver Lining', or by reason of any past or future
distributions or exhibitions of any other or similar
type motion picture films portraying the said deceased Jack Donahue. The plaintiffs also have no
right as against any of the defendants to an injunction to restrain or enjoin any future distributions or exhibitions of the said motion picture or
of any other or similar type motion picture films
portraying the said deceased Jack Donahue.
'' 2. Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah
Code Annotated (1943) accords the plaintiffs no
6
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right to impose any prior restraint or in any manner to restrict, prqhibit, censor or enjoin the
aforesaid distributions and exhibitions of the
motion picture 'Look for the Silver Lining' or of
any other or similar type motion picture films
containing factual or fictional portrayals of a deceased public figure such as Jack Donahue.
'' 3. The distribution and exhibition of the motion picture 'Look for the Silver Lining' and of
other and similar type motion picture films containing factual or fictional portrayals of deceased
public figures such as Jack Donahue are protected
by the free speech and press provisions of the
Utah State and the United States Constitutions,
and Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code
Annotated ( 1943) are not applicable to the distribution or exhibition of motion picture films
containing such portrayals of ·deceased public
figures.
'' 4. The factual or fictional portrayals of deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue in motion picture films and the distribution and exhibition of motion picture films containing such portrayals do not constitute a use of the name, portrait or picture of a person for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade within the meaning
or intent of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 -of the
Utah Code Annotated (1943).
"5. The applicable conflict of laws rule of the
State of Utah requires that the rights and liabilities of the parties herein be determined by the
law of the place where the plaintiffs sustained injury and damage, if any, to their feelings and sensibilities. Since the injury and damage, if any, to
the feelings and sensibilities of the plaintiffs
herein necessarily must occur in the State of California where the plaintiffs have at all times· re-

7
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sided, the rights and liabilities of the parties are
to be determined under the laws of that State.
Under the laws of the State of California, the
plaintiffs have no right of action or right to relief
of any kind for injury or damage to their feelings
and sensibilities by reason of the factual or fictional portrayal of a deceased relative, who, during his lifetime, was a prominent public figure.
''6. The defendant, Warner Bros. Pictures
Distributors Corporation, has the right to distribute and re-distribute, and the defendants, Intermountain Theatres, Inc., and Arch E. and C. E.
Overman, have the right to exhibit and re-exhibit
in the State of Utah, the aforesaid motion picture
'Look for the Silver Lining', also other and similar type motion picture films, free of all past and
future claims or assertions of claims on the part
of the plaintiffs or any of them based upon the
provisions of Section 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the
Utah Code Annotated (1943)."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The trial court erred in denying the motion of
plaintiffs for leave to file the proposed amendment to
their complaint.
2. The trial court erred in its ruling that the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals was not the law of
the case.
3. The trial court erred in its ruling that the plaintiffs were limited in their damages to injury to feelings
and in instructing the jury to that effect.
4. The trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for plaintiffs.
5. Under the uncontradicted evidence plaintiffs \\rere
entitled to a judgment and verdict for:
8
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(a) Actual damages suffered.
(b) Exemplary damages.
6. The trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for new trial.
7. The trial court erred in making and entering its
Declaratory Judgment.
8. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law that
the defendants should prevail in their contentions as to
construction of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of Utah Code
Annotated 1943.
9. The trial court erred in its conclusion of law that
defendants should be granted the relief prayed for in
their counterclaims.
10. The trial court erred in Declaratory Judgment in
decreeing as follows :
(a) That plaintiffs have no right to recover damages against defendants or either of them by reason
of the past or future exhibition of the motion picture
''Look for the Silver Lining''.
(b) That plaintiffs have no right to an injunction
to restrain and enjoin future distributions and exhibitions of said motion picture or any other motion
picture portraying the said deceased Jack Donahue.
(c) That Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of Utah
Code Annotated 1943 accord to plaintiffs no right to
impose any prior restraint or in any manner to restrict, prohibit, censor or enjoin the distribution or
exhibition of said picture or any other or similar type
of motion picture containing factual or fictional portrayal of Jack Donahue or other deceased public
figures.
(d) That such distribution and exhibition of the
motion picture and other similar type of motion pictures are protected by the free speech and press pro9
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visions of the Utah State and United States Constitutions.
(e) That Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 are hot applicable to the distribution and exhibition of motion
picture films containing such portrayals of deceased
public figures.
(f) That factual or fictional portrayals of deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue do not
constitute a use of the :q.ame, portrait or picture of a
person for advertising purposes or purposes of trade
within the meaning or intent of the Utah statutes.
(g) That the rights and liabilities of the parties
should be determined by the laws of the State of California.
(h) That the defendants have the right to distribute ·and redistribute and the right to exhibit and
re-exhibit said picture and other and similar type of
pictures.
11. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Dr. Lorin F. Wheelwright, over the objection of plaintiffs, to answer the following question : ''I wonder if you
would tell the court and jury whether or not in your
opinion, this film, 'Look for the Silver Lining', has educational value~", and in permitting the witness to state
why he thought· that it had such educational value; also
in stating his opinion as to the effect of fictionalization
upon the educational value of the film.
12. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Lilla Belle Pitts to answer, over the objection of plaintiffs, the question, "And did it approve it for educational
purposes ~ ' '
13. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Lilla Belle Pitts to answer, over the objection of plaintiffs, the question, ''Miss Pitts, in seeing this picture,
'Look for the Silver Lining', did you form an opinion as
10
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to whether or not-your personal opinion-as to whether
or not 'Look for the Silver Lining' had educational
value?'', and in permitting the 'vitness to state why she
thought that it had such educational value; and also in
stating her opinion as to the effect of fictionalization upon
the educational value of the film.
14. The trial court erred in permitting the 'vitness
Walter Prichard Eaton to answer, over the objection of
plaintiffs, the question, ''Would this, from your standpoint as a dramatic critic and a teacher of playwriting,
would this production be classed as a biographical play
or something else~", and in permitting the witness to
state the reasons therefor, and in stating his opinion as
to the effect of fictionalization on its classification as a
biographical play.
15. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Walter Prichard Eaton to answer the question, over the
objection of plaintiffs, ''Professor Eaton, you are familiar, of course, as you have testified, with the creation of
dramatic plays, dramatic works of all types. Is the creation and production of a dramatic play or biographical
play considered a matter of trade~", and in stating the
reasons for his answer.
16. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Mark A. May to answer, over the objection of plaintiffs,
the question, "And do you have an opinion as to whether
or not 'Look for the Silver Lining' is of educational or
informative value~", and to state his reasons for such
opinion, and in permitting the witness to state that the
picture- has been requested to be used for educational
purposes.
17. The trial court erred in permitting the witness
Eric Haight to testify that the motion picture had been
approved unanimously by the Screening Council of the
I.J. D. S. Church; and in refusing to strike such evidence.
11
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18. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 1, directing a verdict for
plaintiffs.
19. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 4, with reference to the
exploitation by defendants in Utah of the name of Jack
Donahue as an element of damages to be considered.
20. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 6 as requested with reference to exemplary damages.
21. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 7 with reference to the
meaning of ''trade purposes'' as applied to the case.
22. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 8 or alternate No. 8, with
reference to the meaning of trade or commercial purposes
as applied to the Utah statutes.
23. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 13 with reference to the
.liability of the respective defendants and the damages
for which each would be liable.
24. The trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction No. 15 relating to the educational and informative nature of the film as a guide to
the jury in determining whether or not the motion picture
was educational or informative.
25. The trial court erred in giving its instruction No.
3 with reference to the constitutional provisions relating
to freedom of the press and freedom of speech.
26. The trial court erred in giving its instruction No.
10 with reference to the motion picture being educational
or informative.
27. The trial court erred in giving instruction No. l:l
with reference to waiver of rights of privacy by the deceased Jack Donahue or plaintiffs.

12
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28. The court erred in giving paragraph "c" of instruction No. 14 excluding the theory of damage to property rights.
29. The trial court erred in instructing the jury in
instruction No. 14 that the jury should take into consideration the fact that the plaintiffs were physically
present in California at the time of the showing in Utah
of the film.
ARGUMENT
POINTS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, lO(a) (b) (c) (e) (h),
and 18.
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER
DAMAGES AND TO HAVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ON THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD.
The question involved in these points is as to
whether, under the uncontradicted evidence, plaintiffs
were entitled to recover damages and have injunctive
relief as a matter of law under the Utah statute.
The provisions of the statute are as follows:
'' 103-4-8. Use of Narne or Picture of Individual.
Any person who uses for advertising purposes
or for purposes of trade, or upon any postal card,
the name, portrait or picture of any person, if
such person is living, without first having obtained
the written consent of such person, or, if a minor,
of his parent or guardian, or if such person is
dead, without the written consent of his heirs or
personal representatives, is guilty of a misdemeanor.''
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'' 103-4-9. I d. Civil Liability.

Any living person, or the heirs or personal
representatives of any deceased person, whose
name, portrait or picture is used within this state
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade,
without the \Yritten consent first obtained as provided in the next preceding section may maintain
an action against such person so using his name,
picture or portrait to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may in the same action recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of
such use, and, if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture
in such manner as is declared to be unlawful, the
jury or court, if tried without a jury, in its discretion, may a ward exemplary damages.''
That seems to be clear, understandable and right in
point as applied to the uncontradicted facts established
by the evidence. If the statute means what it says, the
only questions vvhich should have been presented to the
jury should have had to do with the question of damages,
general and punitive; and the court should have concerned itself only with the matter of the injunction.
This statute has never been before this court for
construction or interpretation in any case, probably
because it is so plain in its terms that people have
avoided violating its clear and unambiguous provisions.
It is a misnomer to say that this statute is an official
enactment of the law of privacy in this State. It does
that and more. It is in fact broader than the law of
pr1vacy. It is a legislative enactment conferring on the

14
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heirs of a deceased individual the right to protect his
name, picture or portrait from commercial exploitation
\\'i.thout their "~ritten consent, making it crime to vi<;>late
that right, and creating the right to a cause of action for
damages and injunctive process therefor in favor of the
heirs. It is, therefore, strictly a statutory right over,
above and beyond and distinct from the right of privacy,
the common law right recognized by most States. The
statutory enactment does, however, have the effect of
recognizing the common law right of privacy in the State
of Utah. The two should not, however, be confused.
Decisions involving the law of privacy are not, therefore,
entirely in point on all phases of the subject matter of
this action, but they do involve to a limited extent similar
principles.

a

We call attention of the court to an important point
with reference to the statute: There is no difference
between living and deceased persons as to what may or
may not be done. The only difference is as to who has
the right to the cause of action. Plainly speaking, if
defendants are held by this court to have acted within
their rights as to plaintiffs, then it necessarily follows
that the same thing can happen in Utah to living people.
If plaintiffs, as heirs of Jack Donahue, have no rights
in this case, neither would a living person have any right
to complain if the same thing happens to them. In Utah
the doors will be wide open to the commercial exploitation of the names, pictures, and portraits of all, living
and dead, if done by the movie industry.

15
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The effect, of course, is to ask this court to repeal
the statute or write into it exceptions which will nullify
its applicability to the movie industry. In other words,
the law as announced by this court in this case, under
the Utah statute, applies to both the living and the dead
alike, if your name happens to be valuable for box office
appea~. If they can use the name of Jack Donahue, they
can use the name of anyone, living or dead, whether
residents of this State or not, for the same purpose, and
the more famous the name the greater the temptation
and the more abundant the financial harvest.
The bars will be down and no man's name, picture
or portrait will be safe from those who will seek to
exploit his fame. All they will have to say is: It is the
movie industry that is doing it; it is biographical; it is
fit to be seen by students; it teaches something that
students of some sort want to see; it will entertain the
girl students while the boys take their military drill.
That is what the trial court in this case, in the Declaratory Judgment, announced the law to be. That is what
the trial court, in its rulings on the evidence and in some
of its instructions to the jury on the damage question,
said to the jury. The trial court, in fact, contradicted
itself, both in its instructions to the jury and in its law
as announced to the jury in some of its instructions and
as announced in the Declaratory Judgment. The Declaratory Judgment completely disregarded the statute; ignored the common law right of privacy as adopted and
enlarged by the statute, and refused to recognize the

16
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right of action which the statute creates, as applicable
to the movie industry.
Courts, without statutory enactment, have long recognized and given effect to rights that were essentially
the same as the right of privacy and have recognized the
name, portrait, picture and personality of an individual
as a personal right and a property right that could not
be used or exploited by others for advertising, commercial trade purposes, or in fact for any material purpose,
"\\ithout his consent. It reaches back through England
to ancient Greece and Rome. Some courts based their
decisions on the theory of a property right, some under
the right of contract, and some under Constitutional
guarantees of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
As an independent right with a title, in its modern sense,
in America, it had its inception in an article written in
the Harvard Law Review by Warren and Brandeis in
1890, 4 Harvard Law Review 193. Not all courts immediately adopted the doctrine which had primarily to do
with injury to feelings and was described as the right
to be let alone in one's private life, past and present, and
to which right of action, unlike slander and libel, the
truth was no defense.
41 Am. Juris., Sees. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 13, under Privacy.
One of the courts that refused to recognize the doctrine was the Court of Appeals of the State of New York,
which in Roberson vs. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171
N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, by a bare majority vote decided
17
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that a young lady whose picture had been used to advertise flour had no cause of action. Judge Gray wrote a
dissenting opinion in that case which has become equally
famous with the Warren and Brandeis article as one of
the foundation documents in this branch of the law. His
entire dissenting opinion is an historic pronouncement
because of its immediate effect and because it has become
the basis of decisions by other courts which, without
statutory action, adopted the dissenting opinion of Judge
Gray as sound law. We quote the following from that
·dissenting opinion:
"In the social evolution, with the march of the
arts and sciences and in the resultant effects upon
organized society, it is quite intelligible that new
conditions must arise in personal relations which
the rules of the common law, cast in the rigid mold
of an earlier social status, were not designed to
meet. It would be a reproach to equitable jurisprudence if equity \vere powerless to extend the
application of the principles of common law or of
natural justice in remedying a. wrong which, in
the progress of civilization, has been made possible as the result of new social or commercial
conditions. * * * Security of person is as necessary as the security of property; and for that
complete personal security which will result in
the peaceful and wholesome enjoyment of one's
privileges as a member of society, there should
be afforded protection, not only against the scandalous portraiture and display of one's features
and person, but against the display and use thereof for another's commercial purposes or gain.''
The reaction to this decision "Tas immediate. ThP
next session of the New York Legislature enacted a la,v·
I

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

similar to that in Utah but making it applicable to living
persons only.
Utah followed suit in 1909 by enacting the present
statutes ·w·hich have been known to be the law to the
present time.
Today the majority opinion in the Roberson case is
repudiated by practically all courts.
What \Yas the evil that the statute was intended to
stop1 What ,,~ere the rights that the statute was intended
to safeguard J? The evil \vas so great that both New York
and Utah made it a crime as well as the basis for damages
and injunctive relief. They were not content to let the
matter rest on damages only.
In reading some New York decisions under the
statute, it must be remembered that there is a basic difference between New York and Utah in the interpretation
of penal statutes. In New York they are strictly construed as penal in nature. In Utah both by statute and
decision they are liberally construed to effect the purpose intended.
The most recent case, directly in point, on our own
facts, is the recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in this very case, reversing the
District Court which had granted a motion for Summary
Judgment on these same facts, which facts are not substantially different as produced in the evidence from
those considered and assumed in the Federal Court, and
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which the majority opinion said stated a cause of action.
See the mandate (R. 24-25), and which opinion is recorded at 194 Fed. 2d 6. The entire opinion is right in
point. We quote pertinent parts as follows :
"The action was one for legal and equitable
relief for the wrongful violation of the right of
privacy. The right of privacy may be defined in
general language as the right of the ordinary
person to enjoy life without his name or life being
exploited for commercial purposes by the use of
his name, or the publication or portrayal of his
picture, or career, on the moving picture screen,
in the press, in periodicals, in handbills, in circulars, in catalogues, or in other like manner unless
his consent thereto be first obtained. The right
is sometimes referred to as the right to be let
alone. The principles together with their limitations or qualifications having appropriate application to the right of privacy were presented with
erudite ability in an article written by Warren
and Brandeis and published in 1890, 4 Harvard
Law Review 190. One of the early cases in American jurisprudence dealing \vith the right was
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22, decided a few years after publication of the article
to which reference has just been made. There a
nephew of a deceased aunt, on behalf of himself
and other immediate surviving relatives of the
deceased, sought to enjoin the exhibition of a
statue of the deceased without the consent of
plaintiff and other surviving relatives. The court
held that whatever right of privacy the aunt had
terminated at her death and did not pass to her
heirs or relatives; that plaintiff and other surviving relatives did not represent any right of
privacy which she had during her lifetime; and
that plaintiff and other surviving relatives were
20
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not entitled to injunctive relief on the ground that
the exhibition of the statue would constitute an
inYasion of their personal feelings or sentiments
concerning the memory of the deceased. In Roberson Y. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538,
64 N. E. 442, plaintiff was a young woman whose
photograph or likeness had been appropriated for
advertising purposes by a milling company. She
sought damages for past wrongful use of the
photograph or likeness and also an injunction to
restrain future use of it. It was said in the opinion
of the court that the legislature c~uld very well
provide that no one should be permitted for his
own selfish purpose to use the name or picture of
another for advertising purposes without his consent, but that the legislature had not done so. And
it was held that in the absence of legislation to
that effect, plaintiff was without remedy in the
courts. At its next session after that case was
decided, and primarily in response to the suggestion contained in the opinion of the court, the
legislature of New York enacted sections 50 and
51 of the Civil Rights Law of that state making
penal the use of one's name, picture or portrait
for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade,
without his written consent being obtained, and
creating a civil right to damages for past wrong
of that character as well as injunctive relief to
prevent future wrong. For an authentic statement
of that historic fact as a contributing factor to the
enactment of the statute, see Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097,
affirmed 220 U. S. 502.
"The legislature of Utah in the enactment of
sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9, supra, followed without deviation or departure the statute in New
York in respect to the exploitation for commercial
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ture, or portrait of a living person without his
written consent being first obtained. But the legislature of Utah did not stop there. In section
103-4-8 it also made penal the use for advertising
purposes, or purposes of trade, the name, portrait,
or picture of a deceased person, without the written consent of his heirs or personal representatives; and in section 103-4-9 it also provided with
blueprinted clarity that the heirs or personal representatives of a deceased person shall be entitled
to recover damages for injuries sustained by the
wrongful use for advertising purposes, or for
purposes of trade, of the name, portrait, or picture of the deceased person, and shall be entitled
to restrain further or continued exploitation of
that kind. By section 103-4-9, the legislature
created the right of a living person to recover
damages for such wrongful use of his name, portrait, or picture, and to enjoin further exploitation thereof; and in addition, it created a like right
in the heirs or personal representatives of a deceased person whose name, portrait, or picture
has been or is being used in that manner without
first obtaining the consent in writing of the heirs
or personal representatives. The statute created
an independent right and provided a remedy for
its enforcement. The purpose of the statute was
to grant protection against the appropriation for
commercial purposes of one's name, picture, or
personality. And it should be given a liberal
rather than a narro\v construction. It should be
construed liberally in the light of the legislative
intent and purpose, not in the narrow manner
which would tend to proscribe achievement of th0
desired legislative objective. Sarat Lahiri v. Daily
Mirror, 295 N.Y.S. 382; .J a.ckson v. Consum0r Publications, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 691; Cf. Castle v. Delta
Land & Water Co., 58 Utah 137, 197 Par. 584.
22
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''A statute undertaking to forbid publication
in the press or elsewhere of matters essentially
educational or informative in character, or undertaking to prohibit the use of matters of that kind
on the motion p'icture screen, would immediately
suggest its own fatal infirmity. And similarly, a
statute essaying to prevent the publication of current news, or the recounting or portrayal of actual
events of public interest as is conventionally done
in a conventional newspaper or in a conventional
newsreel on the motion picture screen, would be
promptly challenged in respect to its validity on
recognized grounds of long established principles
of law. But this statute does not undertake to forbid any, every, and all use of the name, picture,
or personality of an individual without written
consent being first obtained. It is expressly confined to the appropriation of the name, picture, or
personality of an individual for advertising purposes, or for purposes of trade. It is explicitly
limited to exploitation of that kind. It does not
undertake to forbid publication in the press or
elsewhere of· matters essentially educational or
informative, even though the name or picture of
an individual is used incidentally in connection
therewith. Neither does it undertake to prevent
the dissemination of news in which the public has
an interest in the press, on the motion picture
screen in the form of a newsreel, or .otherwise,
even though the name or picture of an individual
is used incidentally in that connection. Binns v.
Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N. E.
1108, L. R. A. 1915C 839; Humiston v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 178 N. Y. S. 752; Kreiger v. Popular Publications, 3 N.Y.S. {2d) 480.
''Fairly construed, the amended complaint alleged in substance that with minor exceptions the
moving picture in question was untrue; that it
23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was essentially a product of fiction; and that as a
part thereof, the name, picture, and personality of
Donahue were used for purposes of trade, without
the consent of plaintiffs being first obtained in the
manner required by the statute. While by answer
many of the material allegations contained in the
amended complaint were denied, the motion for
summary judgment admitted all matters well
pleaded in such complaint. That was the posture
of the case at the time the summary judgment was
entered. The manufacture, distribution, and exhibition of a motion picture of the kind pleaded in
the amended complaint, based primarily upon fiction or the imaginative, and designed primarily
to entertain and amuse an audience desiring entertainment and willing to pay therefor, does not constitute the publication .or information and educational matters, or the dissemination of news, or
the recounting or portrayal of actual events of
public interest in the form of a newsreel, as distinguished from commercial activities for gain or
profit, within the intent and meaning of the
statute. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
supra; Humiston v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., supra; Krieger v. Popular Publications,
supra. According to the amended complaint,
Donahue had been dead many years at the time
of the institution of the action. And of course
another person necessarily portrayed him in the
moving picture. But his name was used and the
moving picture purported to portray his personality and career. It was not alleged in the amended complaint that use was made of an actual
photograph or portrait of Donahue. But that was
unnecessary, as a picture within the meaning of
the statute includes any representation of the
person. Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
supra. To hold that the use of the name and the
representation of the personality of Donahue in
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the manner alleged in the amended complaint fails
to come within the purview of the statute would
narro"" the statute by a tortured construction not
in harmony ''"·ith its plain legislative intent and
purpose.
''Endeavoring to sustain the summary judgment, appellees present the argument that Donahue was a public figure and that the statute does
not forbid the use of the name or picture of such
a figure without consent first being obtained. As
previously indicated, it was averred in the amended complaint that Donahue was a dancer, singer,
outstanding comedian, and foremost entertainer;
that he starred and co-starred in productions in
New York; that he did not appear in motion pictures or night clubs; that he wrote certain articles;
and that in collaboration with another person, he
wrote the script for a show. The statute was not
intended to protect in undiminished degree the
privacy of a public figure. By becoming a public
:figure, one may relinquish in part the right of
privacy which would be his under other circumstances. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.
( 2d) 806, 138 A.L.R. 15, certiorari denied, 311 U.
S. 711. The right may be waived completely or
only in part. It may be waived for one purpose,
and still be asserted for another. But the existence of the waiver carries with it the right to
invade the right of privacy of the individual only
to the extent legitimately necessary and proper in
dealing with the matter which gave rise to the
waiver. The question whether a person is a public
figure and therefore has waived in part his right
of privacy may rest upon various and variable
facts and circumstances. And no rule of thumb
has been evolved for its easy solution in all cases.
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122
Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101. We find our;.
25
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selves unable to share the view that Donahue's
accomplishments as a dancer, singer, comedian,
entertainer, and writer, made him such a public
figure that his name, picture, or career could be
dramatized in a motion picture photoplay based
primarily upon fiction and the picture exhibited
in Utah for commercial purposes, without violating the right of privacy which the statute was
intended to protect. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne
& Heath, 68 N.Y.S. (2d) 779.
''In a further effort to uphold the summary
judgment, appellees contend in substance that if
the statute be construed as broad enough to prohibit the portrayal of a deceased public figure it
would constitute an unreasonable restraint upon
the guaranteed freedoms· of speech and press. It
is argued in support of the contention that dealing
fictionally with deceased public figures is an important part of our culture, and the right to do so
is one which is necessary for the survival of our
culture; that in modern times the portraying of
deceased public figures fictionally is one of the
most common forms of artistic creation in the
novel, drama, and motion picture; that motion
pictures fictionalizing historical characters and
events are common media of communicating ideas;
and that to interpret the statute in such manner
as to prevent the fictionalizing of a deceased public figure would constitute a restraint upon the
freedom of that mode of expression, in violation
of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech and of press. If the statute undertook to
restrict or forbid the publication of matters educational or informative or strictly biographical
in character, or the dissemination of news in the
form of a newsreel or otherwise, it would be open
to challenge on the ground of objectionable restraint upon the freedo'fn of speech and press. But
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it does nothing of the kind. It is content to forbid
the appropriation of the name, picture, or personality of an individual for commercial purposes,
or for purposes of trade, as distinguished from
the publication of matters educational or informative or purely biographical in kind, or the dissemination of ne"~s in the form of a newsreel or
other,Yise. And the constitutional guaranty of
free speech and free press in its full sweep does
not undertake to create an inviolate asylum for
unbridled appropriation or exploitation of the
name, picture, or personality of a deceased public
figure for purely commercial purposes, or solely
for purposes of trade, with the state powerless to
enact appropriate forbidding or remedial legislation.''
That is the law of this case. While this court is not
bound to follow the Tenth Circuit as to its interpretation
of the Utah statute, it should do so in deciding the rights
of these parties; and the decision of that group of
eminent jurists should be very persuasive, particularly
on the grounds upon which defendants seek to escape
liability as hereafter considered.
It would seem in the face of that decision in this
case, on the same facts, that the trial court should have
directed a verdict for plaintiffs, leaving only the matter
of damages for consideration.
The evidence given by the witnesses for defendants
was not germane to the real issue in the case, namely,
the actual use to which the picture was put.
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POINTS 7, 8, 10 (f) and 15
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY, AS REQUESTED BY
PLAINTIFFS, THAT EXHIBITION OF THE PICTURE WAS FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE AND IN DECREEING IN THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
THAT IT WAS NOT FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE.
Here, again, the trial court was not consistent with
itself in its legal pronouncements in this case.
In its instruction No. 2 it instructed the jury that
plaintiffs could recover if they proved the allegations of
their complaint. One of the issues was that the name
was used for purposes of trade. While defendants denied
that the exhibition was for purposes of trade, they admitted the facts, which, in law, constitute trade or commercial purposes.
The facts as to the nature of the use to which the
picture was put, being undisputed, it was the duty of
the trial court to instruct the jury that the name and
picture of Jack Donahue were used in violation of the
statute, and that the only question for the jury to decide
was the quantum of damages.
It was not possible to draw more than one inference
from the undisputed facts. The picture 'vas exhibited
in motion picture theaters in Utah to the public for an
admission fee to the exhibitor and a rental or license fee
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to the distributor. There 'Yas no dispute in the evidence
on those basic facts ; in fact defendants produced no
sritnesses other than its experts, "·hose evidence is elsewhere discussed. The trial court so stated in its instruction No. 5.
Also, in its instruction No. 3 the court instructed
the jury that if the picture was fictional or imaginative
that it would be a violation of the statute and plaintiffs
could recover.
These instructions permitting recovery are in direct
conflict with the legal pronouncement in the declaratory
judgment that it was not for purposes of trade.
Upon the undisputed evidence the trial court should
have instructed the jury that there was no issue on that
point and should have instructed them that the exhibition of ''Look for the Silver Lining'' in the commercial
theaters in the State of Utah was for purposes of trade
under the law.
The trial court in paragraph 4 of its Declaratory
Judgment held:
''The factual or fictional portrayals of deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue in
motion picture films and the distribution and exhibition of motion picture films containing such portrayals do not constitute a use of the name, portrait or picture of a person for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade within the meaning
or intent of Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the
Utah Code Annotated 1943.''
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As a general proposition, the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures constitute a trade or commerce.

Un.ited States vs. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
· 334 U. S. 131, 92 L. Ed. 1260
Campbell vs. Motion Picture Machine Operators
Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N. W. 781; 27 A.L.R.
631.
Indeed, the whole concept of trade, in statutes regulating
our modern complex industrial and economic life, has
come a long way from the old concept of trade as being
limited to the barter or exchange of goods.
United States v. Associated Press, 326 U. S. 1,
89 L. Ed. 2013.
(News gathering and dissemination)
U. S. vs. Southeastern Underwriters Association,
322 U. S. 533, 88 L. Ed. 1440
(Insurance)
American Medical Association vs. U. S.,
317 U. S. 519, 87 L. Ed. 434.
(Group medical plans)
The record in the case at bar shows that the motion picture ''Look for the Silver Lining'' was sho,vn at numerous houses in Utah, at which admission was charged by
the exhibitor and a rental exacted by the distributor,
for all of which the governing factor in these operations was the profit motive (R. 286).
The question proposed by the trial court's ruling
in paragraph No. 4 quoted above is whether the Utah
Statute gives a narrower meaning to "purposes of
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trade'' than the connotation of ordinary usage. That
question may best be answered by referring to the genesis
of the Utah Statute. In Ne'v York, in Roberson vs. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N. Y. 538, 63 N. E.
442, the New York Court of Appeals determined that in
the absence of any statute on the subject, there did not
exist in that State a right of a woman to prevent the use
of her portrait by others for advertising purposes without her consent. The Chief Justice of the Court in the
opinion suggested that the right of privacy to that extent
might be protected by an act of the legislature. Shortly
after the New York legislature enacted Chapter 132 of the
Laws of 1903, which is now Sections 50 and 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Code. In 1908, in Rhodes vs. Sperry
and Hutchinson, 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, the constitutionality of that statute was sustained by the New
York Court of Appeals. In 1909 Utah enacted Chapter
61, La,vs of Utah, 1909, which are now Sections 103-4-7,
8 and 9. Placing the language of Section 3 of the Utah
Act ·and Section 2 of the New York Act side by side
indicates clearly that most of the language of the Utah
Act was lifted verbatim from the New York Act. New
York Section 2 states :
''Any person whose name, portrait or picture
is used within this State for advertising purposes
or for the purposes of trade without the written
consent first obtained as above provided, may
maintain an equitable action in the Supreme
Court of this State against the person, firm or
corporation so using his name, portrait or picture,
to prevent and restrain the use thereof and may
also sue an~ recover damages for any injuries
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sustained by reason of such use, and if the defendant shall knowingly use such person's name,
portrait or picture in such a manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this Act, the
jury in its discretion may award exemplary
damages.''
Utah Section 3 provides:
''Any living person or the heirs or personal
representatives of any deceased person whose
name, portrait or picture is used within this State
for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade
without the written consent first obtained as herein
provided, may maintain an action against such
person so using his name, picture or portrait, to
prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may in
the same action recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use, and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name,
portrait or picture in such a manner as is declared
to be unlwful by this Act, the jury or court, if tried
without a jury, in its discretion may award exemplary damages. ''
(Words added in Utah in italics)
Therefore, in the absence of anything to the contrary
being shown as to the intent of the Utah legislature, the
New York cases on the question of ''purposes of trade'',
as used in the New York statute, should be persuasive, if
not controlling. The retention of the language from 1909
through the various codifications and compilations to the
new 1953 Code infers an acquiescense by the Utah legislature in the New York decisions and interpretations
made during that period.
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50 Am. Jur. Statutes, Sec. 458
Pointedly enough, the leading New York case on the
issue is one applying the Statute to motion pictures.
Binns v. Vitagraph Company, 210 N.Y. 51;
103 N. E. 1108; L. R. A. 1916 C 839
decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1913.
In that case, the defendant was a producer and distributor of motion picture films. In January 1909, the
steamships "Republic" and "Florida" came into collision at sea. The "Republic" was equipped with wireless
telegraphy instruments and the plaintiff was the operator. After the collision, he sent a danger signal "C.Q.D."
which was received by a wireless operator on another
ship and, as a result, the passengers on the Republic
were saved. Soon after the date of the collision, the defendant proceeded to make a series of pictures entitled
''C. Q. D.'', or Saved by Wireless, a true story of the
wreck of the Republic.'' These pictures were manufactured and made up in the studio of the defendant by the
use of scenery prepared for the purpose and of actors
employed to impersonate the plaintiff and others. The
pictures included the name of Binns and showed him as
a wireless operator of the Republic. An action was
brought to enjoin the use of his name in the pictures and
recover damages. After reviewing the history of the New
York statute and outlining the evidence as to the making
of the pictures showing it was done with professional
actors, the New York court said:
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''It is not necessary in this opinion to discuss
the question whether a person, firm, or corporation would be liable under the statute for making
and using a picture of a living person, when it is
included in a picture of an actual event in which
such person was an actor, and such picture is a
mere incident to the actual event portrayed. The
use of the plaintiff's name and picture, as shown
by the testimony in this case, was not a mere
incident to a general picture representative of
the author's understanding of what occurred at
the wreck of the Republic. The first picture of the
series was essentially a picture of the plaintiff,
although included therewith was a place having
relation to the other parts of the pictures exhibited; but the last picture of the series had no
connection whatever with any other place or
/
person or with any event. His alleged personal
7
·' movements, as exhibited in the now well-known
form of moving pictures, had no relation to the
other pictures, and it was not designed to instruct
or educate those who saw it. The defendant used
the plaintiff's alleged picture to amuse those who
paid to be entertained. If the use of the plaintiff's
name and picture as shown in this case is not
within the terms of the statute, then the picture
of any individual can be similarly made and exhibited for the purpose of showing his peculiarities as of dress and walk, and his personal fads,
eccentricities, amusements, and even his private
life. By such pictures an audience would be
amused and the maker of the films and the exhibitors would be enriched. The greater the exaggeration in such a series of pictures, so long as they
were not libelous, the greater would be the profit
of the picture maker and exhibitor. We hold that
the name and picture of the plaintiff were used
by the defendant as a matter of business and
34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

profit and cont~ra·ry to the prohibition of the
statute . . . "
Six years later, 1n Humiston vs. Universal Film
Manufacturing Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. Supp.
752, the Ne'v York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
recognized that the production of motion pictures was
for purposes of ''trade'' under the decision of the Binns
case, but held that the production of news reels showing
a ''truthful picture taken of a current event at the time
that it happened" 'vas not the use of a name or portrait
for purposes of advertising or trade and made an analogy
of a ne"\YS reel to a newspaper. The line between trade
uses prohibited and those within the realm of the Humiston case was again drawn in 1932 in Blumenthal vs. Picture Classics, 251 N. Y. S. 800; 235 App. Div. 570.
In that case, the defendant made movie shorts of
historical points in New York City. Included were scenes
in the New York lower East side. It engaged four professional actors who posed as guides to two school teachers who were making a tour of the City in order to give
continuity to the various historical points of interest.
One of the scenes of the Lower East Side showed the
plaintiff in her trade of selling bread and rolls on the
streets. The scene consisted of only nine feet out of a
total of fifteen hundred and fifty feet and a total of six
seconds out of seventeen. minutes. The lower court
granted an injunction pendente lite, and this was affirmed
by the Appellate Division, both courts holding that the
portrayal was for purposes of trade. The question was ..
cited to the New York Court of Appeals and that court
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refused to pass on the issue of purpose of trade, but held
that the injunction was properly issued.
Blumenthal vs. Picture Classics, 261 N. Y. 504; 185
N. E. 713.
Concededly 1n "Look for the Silver Lining", the
producers engaged in dramatic license and fiction to
create audience appeal. (Testimony of Dr. Wheelwright
at pages 420-422 of the Record). The biographical elements of the two principal characters, Marilyn Miller
and Jack Donahue, were not correct from the point of
chronology and conjunction. (Testimony of Miss Pitts,
R. 462). So althol)gh comparable, in the opinion of Miss
Pitts, to the famous opera ''Die Maestersinger'' (R. 462),
the motion picture in the case at bar is also more comparable to the ''Wreck of the Republic'' in the Binns
•
case.
Another New York case, Martin v. New Metropolitan
Fiction, 248 N. Y. S. 359, 139 Misc. 290, makes the point
where the line is drawn in New York quite clear. In that
case the defendant was the publisher of the magazine,
"True Detective Mysteries". One of its stories, which
concededly told a true story of a murder, was illustrated
with a picture of the plaintiff, who was the mother lof
one Blossom Martin who was the victim of the villain
of the article in the magazine, and the article contained
an actual picture of a courtroom scene showing the tearful mother. The court said that no claim was made that
the article which the picture illustrates was untrue, nor
36
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was there any claim that the picture itself was not a
correct representation of an actual scene during the
trial of the villain. The sole question pres en ted was
"·hether the defendant used the picture for purposes of
trade, and the court stated at page 361 of 248 N.Y.S.:

"Apparently, legitimate use of names and pictures in commercial enterprises depends upon the
purpose, Yie"·ing the matter from the standpoint
of the reaction of the public rather than from the
standpoint of the person who uses them. Names
and pictures are legitimately used in connection
'vith mere items of news, with matters of history
of public men and events, and with matters which
are submitted to the public in a way which invites
public comment. Even private social affairs and
prevailing fashions involving persons who make
no bid for publicity are by custom regarded as
public property where the apparent use is to convey information in interest and not mere advertising.
''The use of the name and picture, in the various ways mentioned, are generally important
features in many commercial ventures and their
success aided thereby. Nevertheless, from the
standpoint of the public, the use is not for purposes of trade. The distinction is well illustrated
in the motion picture cases. Such pictures por- traying current events are rega.rded by the public
as primarily educational rather than commercial,
while a mere dramatization of the same events
will be considered essentially commercial.''
The Utah statute has been construed by only one
other court, and that in connection with the very case at
bar. In Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 Fed. 2d
6, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, on review
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of a Motion to Dismiss the complaint granted by Judge
Ritter in the U. S. District Court, held:
''The manufacture, distribution and exhibition
of a motion picture of the kind pleaded in the
Amended Complaint, based primarily upon fiction
or the imaginative, and designed primarily to
entertain and amuse an audience desiring entertainment and willing to pay therefor, does not
constitute the publication of information and educational rna tters, or the dissemination of ·news,
or the recounting or portrayal of actual events of
public interest in the form of newsreels, as distinguished from commercial activities for gain or
profit, within the intent and meaning of the
statute."
And that decision was, 1n effect, ratified by the 1953
Utah legislature. It had before it House Bill 89 in which
an attempt was made to limit the protection of the Utah
Act to domiciliaries or those who had resided in the State
for twenty years or more, and limit the protection as to
deceased persons to immediate heirs. (See House Journal, 51st day, pages 17 and 18). No attempt was made
to change the reference to "purposes of trade", and
the en tire bill was rejected by the House by a vote of
37-20 (House Journal, 51st day, page 18). A similar bill
was· also tabled by the Senate.
The trial court was undoubtedly influenced in its
Declaratory Judgment on this phase of the problem by
the constitutional question, elsewhere discussed, and the
decision of this court in Paramor Theater Company v.
Trade Commission, 95 Utah 354, 81 Pac. 2d 639, holding
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that motion picture theaters are not within the jurisdiction of the Trade Commission of Utah relating to commerce or trade as defined in that law.
The meaning of words is derived from the context
and setting in ""'hich they are used. Obviously motion
pictures have nothing to do with the selling of trademarked goods, which is the subject matter covered by
the legislation enacted to administer the Fair Trade
.A. ct, which has to do exclusively with abuses relating to
the sale of merchandise at less than cost or trade-marked
merchandise at less than the price stipulated by the
manufacturer.
So too, as stated by this court in Beard v. Board of
Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 Pac. 2d 900, the use of pictures
in schools for educational or extra-curricular purposes,
is not trade or commerce.
No such questions are involved in this case. The
use here was of a commercial film in a regular theatre
for an admission fee, to which the public was solicited.
This court, in the Paramor Theatre case, expressly
recognized the difference by referring to Humiston case
in New York, the Campbell case in Minnesota, and the
Kozy Theater case in Kentucky and said that the broader
interpretation was given in those cases because ''the
context seemed to require it''. This court simply held
that, from a reading of the whole Fair Trade Act, it
was not evident that the legislature intended it to apply
to motion picture theaters and that in interpreting such
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a law it should clearly appear from the enactment itself
that an activity was covered by clear and decisive words
or the court should not bring them in by judicial construction of doubtful words. This latter salutory statement could well apply to Judge Van Cott's exemption
of the movie industry from operation of our statute in
addition to serving as a basis for understanding the decision in that case. Neither the Paramor case nor the Beard
case has anything to do with the principle involved in
tbis case. Both cases have to do with interpretation of
the words as applied to particular statutory enactments.
In the case at bar the use of the word ''trade'' is in
connection with a different statute, relating to a different
subject matter, and for the purpose of correcting or preventing an evil which has to do with the use of a name.
All decided cases relating to the law of privacy and under
the New York statute have held that the law applies to
movies, radios, newspapers, books and magazines, within
proper limits.
Judge Van Cott's Paragraph No. 4 of the Declaratory Judgment goes beyond both the New York cases
and the Court of Appeals decision. He holds factual or
fictional portrayals to be without the statute. The New
York rule has the saluto;ry purpose of avoiding substantially the constitutional question which bothered the
lower court in its Par. No. 3 and the Court of Appeals
in the Donahue case in the dissenting opinion. By limiting the protection of the statute as did Judge Bratton,
in the Court of Appeals (page 13 of 194 Fed. 2d 6), the
40
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constitutional issue is aYoided. The interpretation of the
lo\ver court here as to purposes of trade does the same
thing constitutionally, but it does it by effectively exempting the motion picture industry from the Utah statute
and giving Hollywood a carte blanche in the State of
Utah, short only of libel, and of course libel does not
surYive death as does the protection of the Utah statute.
Public figures ''such as Jack Donahue'', whatever that
means, are now fair game. Poor Mr. Binns in the ''Wreck
of the Republic'' could be portrayed as a drunk and
asleep at his post rather than as the hero of the rescue.
The great pioneers of our State and its illustrious men
and women of the remote and immediate past may be
portrayed without any other limitation than the conscience of the writer or producer, all for the glory and
profit of the motion picture industry and safe from the
restraints of the Utah statute, so long as it is a motion
picture or any other of the other media in the same category. Manifestly, the ruling of the trial court is a distortion of the meaning and intent of the statute. Newsreels ~ Yes. Documentaries and similar educational :films
put out by the organizations represented by Mr. Eric
Haight (R. 330 and 349) ~ Yes. Even though Warner
Bros. may find such an enthusiastic ex-educator as Dr.
Wheelwright to sound the tocsin for ''Look for the Silver
Lining'' as the perfect instrument for education, it is
submitted that the Utah Statute means what it says and
that the ordinary Hollywood feature film, which obviously
includes "Look for the Silver Lining", is not privileged
no matter how famous its characters. And with all due
respect to Professor Eaton, whether putting Prince
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Albert on a can is trade and portraying him in ''Victoria
Regina" is art (R. 489) is not even a matter before this
court. The question is whether ordinary feature commercial motion pictures have an unbridled right to portray in Utah figures "like Jack Donahue", factually or
fictionally, without regard to the Utah statute. It is submitted the statute clearly says "no" and that paragraph
4 of the Declaratory Judgment of the District Court is
In error.
Of course, what may be done by the movies may be
done by television, and also the radios, the public press
and fiction writers. If Judge Van Cott's Declaratory
Judgment is the law in this State the statute is amended
thereby to exclude all such activities, the bars are down,
and the wolves of fictionalization are at large without
restraint.

r

Yes, the decision goes farther. Those agencies may
even dig up the past as to living persons and the law of
privacy in Utah is a thing of the past. Just when did
the people of Utah give to the courts the power to amend
laws~ Their duty is to interpret the law-not make it.
The sons and daughters, and even the husbands or
wives, of many of our illustrious forebears are still with
us. Would they have no recourse to stop such exploitation~ The statute says ''yes''. Judge Van Cott says
''No, if it is a movie.'' If he is right it extends to everything else within the same category. It is not the law.
It is legally and morally wrong.
42
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POINTS 1, 3, 19, 28 and 10 (a)
THE TRI . .-\L COURT ERRONEOUSLY LIMITED
PLAINTIFFS TO IN JURY TO THEIR FEELINGS
IN THE nLA_TTER OF D.AJ\LA_GES AND ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION
OF EXPLOIT_._c\.TION OF THE NAME OF JACK
DONAHUE BY DEFENDANTS, FOR PURPOSES OF
TR.ADE, IN THE ST_A_TE OF UTAH AS AN ISSUE
TO BE TRIED.
This point appeared first in the case when plaintiffs,
by timely application, requested permission to file an
amendment to their complaint as follows:
'' 13. That prior to the death of said Jack
Donahue and for many years prior thereto said
Jack Donahue used his name in the entertainment
and literary field throughout the United States,
including the State of Utah, and acquired a reeognized standing therein and aequired great value
in said name as an entertainer and author; and
that said name of Jack Donahue was extensively
advertised and brought to public notice in connection with entertainment, dancing and as an
author. That said defendants, by their unlawfuh
and unauthorized use of said name for trade and
commercial purposes have exploited and used
said name for their financial gain to the extent of
thousands of dollars and to the damage of plaintiffs in the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars.''
The trial court denied this request upon the ground
that it was not a proper issue to be considered (R. 70).
In its instructions to the jury the court so stated (R.
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555) ; and it refused to issue an injunction against defendants from exploiting and using the name in Utah
for purposes of trade. In all of these respects the trial
court was in error.
This issue has been passed on in a number of cases
arising under the law of privacy without the aid of a
statute and under the New York statute, and in this case
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit.
The trial court refused to follow those cases.
Our statute creates the right on the part of heirs to
sue for damages and for an injunction. It cannot be
denied that the legislature had the power to create such
a cause of action in the heirs.
Both by statute in this State and under the common
law relating to privacy forbidding the use of an individual's name for advertising or trade purposes, the
value of the name which is commercialized and exploited
for trade purposes should be a material issue to be considered by the jury in the assessment of damages and
for the court in its consideration of the request for injunctive relief.
The difficulty with the trial court \Yas that it could
see only one phase of the problem-injury to f celings.
It could not see the broader phase of exploitation of the
name for purposes of trade in addition to or asidP from
injury to feelings. It could not see that a party has the
right to stop his name or the name of the decedent from
being exploited for trade purposes regardless of 'vhether
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it hurts his feelings. It could not see that the statute
was intended to stop the use of the name for trade purposes \vhether it damages him or not and regardless of
the nature of the damage. The use of the name for trade
purposes \Yithout permission is the wrong that the statute
says should be prohibited and penalized.
The good name of an individual is often his most
valued possession. It is true with most people. To have
it commercialized without his permission may be not only
Yery hurtful to the feelings, but in the case of professional people may destroy the very thing that they have
made into a valuable asset.
An individual may spend a lifetime at work, training and good effort in creating the value which may be
attached to his name. Under the trial court's ruling in
this case this may be taken by another and exploited for
gain so long as you do not injure his feelings-in other
words, so long as it is complimentary. Such was not the
purpose of the statute.
Let us :first see if our understanding of the purpose
of the statute is correct.
41 Am. Juris, 933, Section 10 :
''Statutes have been enacted in some states
making it a misdemeanor to use, for purposes of
advertising or trade, the name, portrait, or picture of a person without his consent, and giving
a person whose name, portrait, or picture is so
used a right of action for damages or for an injunction. Such statutes have been held to be conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stitutional. This type of statute is directed
against the commercial exploitation of one's personality. It does not prohibit every use of the
name or likeness of a person. In determining
\Vhether a name or likeness is used primarily for
advertising or trade, within the meaning of a
statute, the court may consider the circumstances
and the extent, degree, or character of the use.
The words 'picture' and 'portrait', as used in
such statutes, would apparently include any representation, whether by photograph, painting, or
sculpture. It has been said that such a statute is
in part penal, and that the strictness of its construction should be governed accordingly. But
it has also been suggested that the construction
should aid the remedial aspects and purposes of
the statute.''
The New York courts have said that the statute was
directed ''against the commercial exploitation of one's
personality", and had its "roots in dissatisfaction with
what was felt to be an archaic rule of law".
The court was referring, of course, to the majority
opinion in the case of Roberson vs. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, which caused the
New York Legislature at its next session to enact the
statute.
The purpose of the New York statute was also considered in the case of Rhodes vs. Sperry & H. Co., 193
N. Y. 223, attacking the constitutionality of the statute,
which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States, 220 U. S. 502, 55 L. Ed. 561. It was there stated
in the following language :
46
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"The power of the legislature in the absence
of any constitutional restriction to declare that a
particular act shall constitute a crime or be
actionable as a tort cannot be questioned, where
the right established or recognized and sought to
be protected is based upon an ethical sanction.
Such is the character of the right of privacy preserYed by legislation protecting persons against
the unauthorized use of their names or portraits
in the form of advertisements or trade notices.
It is a recognition by the lawmaking power of
the Yery general sentiment which prevailed
throughout the community against permitting advertisers to promote the sale of their wares by this
method, regardless of the wishes of the persons
thereby affected. There was a natural and widespread feeling that such use of their names and
portraits in the absence of consent was indefensible in morals and ought to be prevented by law.
Hence, the enactment of this statute.''

See also Gardella vs. Log Cabin Products, 89 Fed.
2d 891.
Neyla;nd vs. Home Pattern Co., 65 Fed. 2d 363.
Many of the early cases in England and in the United
States, before publication of the famous article by War~
ren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review ( 4 H.L.R.
192) and before any statutes were enacted, had afforded
some relief on the theory that names and pictures are a
personal or property right of the individual. Many of
the modern cases have recognized that principle without
the aid of a statute. With the statute there should be
no doubt.
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In another New York case, the famous Grand Opera .
star, Mary Garden, gave her written consent, without
consideration (which is hard to understand in these days)
to the use of her name in connection with the sale of a
certain brand of perfume. She then changed her mind
and revoked the license or permit. She sued to enjoin
the use and the New York Court, in Garden vs. Parfumerie Rigaud, 271 N. Y. S. 187, issued the injunction,
say1ng:
"Regardless of plaintiff's reason for her refusal to continue permission to use her name, and
even admitting that her reason is ulterior and
mercenary, it cannot be denied that her name and
her portrait a.re her own and during life solely at
her disposal.''
This was under the New York statute. Similar rights
are given to the immediate heirs of deceased persons
under out statute; otherwise the statutes are the same.
The Tenth Circuit Court in its decision in this case
announced that the purpose of the Utah statute is to
prohibit exploitation of the name by another.
The following cases recognized those principles
without a specific statute:
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Company, Inc., 166 Ore.
482, 113 Pac. 2d 438, 138 A. L. R. 1 (See annotation page 22).
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N. J.
Eq. 136; 67 A. 392.
Pa.vesich v. N e'v England Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
122 Ga. 190; 50 S. E. 68.
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Flake "'· Greensboro N e"~s Co., 212 N. C. 780; 195
S.E. 55.
Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652; 134 S. W.
1076.
We take the liberty of quoting from the last case
above as follows :
''Property is not necessarily a taxable thing
any more than it is always a tangible thing. It
may consist of things incorporeal, and things incorporeal may consist of rights common in every
man. * * * If a man has a right to his own image
as made to appear by his picture, it cannot be
appropriated by another against his consent. It
must strike the most obtuse that a claim of exclusive right to one's picture is a just claim. * * *
One may have peculiarity of appearance, and if
it is to be made a matter of merchandise, why
should it not be for his benefit~ It is a right which
he may wish to exercise for his own profit, and
why may he not restrain another who is using it
for gain~ If there is value in it, sufficient to
excite the cupidity of another, why is it not the
property of him who gives it the value and from
whom the value springs~

* * * * *
''We therefore conclude that one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its
being a property right of material profit. We
also consider it to be a property right of value,
in that it is one of the modes of securing to a
person the enjoyment of life and the exercise of
liberty, and that novelty of the claim is no objection to relief. If this right is, in either respect,
invaded, he may have his remedy, either by restraint in equity or damages in any action at law.
If there are special damages, they may be stated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

and recovered; but such character of damage is
not necessary to the action, since general damages
may be recovered without a showing of specific
loss; and if the element of malice appears, as that
term is known to the law, exemplary damages
may be recovered.''
In the case of Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co. from
State of Oregon, cited above, Justice Lusk has given a
very learned review of the law of privacy as it has been
developed since the Warren and Brandeis article started
the trend of modern thought on the subject. We quote
the following, which seems particularly applicable to
the reasoning which should be influential in interpreting
the end sought to be accomplished by the statute:
''As to names, it is the general rule (although,
as we have observed, there is authority to the
contrary) that a person has no such exclusive
right to the use of his own name as to prevent the
assumption of its use by another. But it is different when one's own name is used in such a way
as to amount to unfair competition. In connection
with questions of that kind, a man's name is said
to be his O"\Vn property. * * *
''By analogy to this principle, there ought to
be little difficulty today in deciding a question
such as that involved in the Roberson case in
favor of the one asserting the exclusive right to
the use of his own picture as against appropriation by another for the purpose of advertising his
wares; for selling one's likeness to be so used is
today a business in itself. Faces, some faces, at
any rate, have a recognized commercial value. The
face of the plaintiff in the Roberson case must
have had such value, else the defendants would
not have gone to the trouble and expense of repro-
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dueing and distributing broadcast her likeness.
If it 'vas of value to the defendants, why not to
her, even though :she preferred not to capitalize
upon itJ?
''Our consideration of the subject leads us to
the conclusion that natural justice and the needs
of the society in 'vhich we live should prevail over
objections based upon the novelty of the asserted
cause of action. It is time that fictions be abandoned and the real character of the injury be
frankly avowed. When Brandeis and Warren
wrote in 1890, it 'vas the unseemly intrusions of
a portion of the press into the privacy of the
home that was emphasized as the main source of
evil ; since then motion pictures and the radio
have -been perfected and have taken their places
among our great industries, while instantaneous
photography today accomplishes miracles scarcely
dreamed of fifty years ago. Thus, the potentialities for this character of wrong are now greatly
multiplied. A decision against the right of privacy would be nothing less than an invitation to
those so inclined who control these instrumentalities of communication, information and education,
to put them to base uses, with complete immunity,
and without regard to the hurt done to the sensibilities of individuals whose private affairs might
be exploited, "\vhether out of malice or for selfish
purposes.''
The Oregon Court 1n the above case also quoted
with approval the following from Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., supra:
" 'If a man's name be his own property, as no
less an authority than the United States Supreme
Court says it is (Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer,
139 lJ. S. (540) 542, 11 S. Ct. 625, 35 L. Ed. 247)
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it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast
of one's features is not also one's property, and
why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not
belong to its owner, rather than to the person
seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.' "
In the case of Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.
2nd 243, 168 A. L. R. 430 (1944) the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the following definition of the law of
privacy:
'' 'The following is offered, by the present
writer, as a fairly comprehensive definition of
what constitutes an actionable invasion of the
right of privacy :-The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the
public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities, in such
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.' ''
State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86; 229 Pac. 317 :
"Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or
is so personal and valuable to him as his name.
His reputation and the character he has built up
are inseparably connected with it. Others can
have no right to use it without his express consent,
and he has a right to go into any court at any
time to enjoin or prohibit any unautho'rized use
of it. Nor is it necessary that it be alleged or
proved that such unauthorized use will damage
him. This the law will presume. ''

K unz u. Allen, 102 Kan. 883; 172 Pae. 532.
Hanna Mfg. Co. v. 1/illerich & Bradsby Co.,

78 Fed 2d 763, 101 A. L. R. 484.
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By enactment of the statute, Utah adopted as the
la"rs of Utah those basic principles.
The Utah statute is not limited to injured feelings,
although they are included within the statute. The
statute is much broader than the law of privacy, if this
term is restricted to injured feelings alone. It precludes,
prohibits and makes criminal and actionable as a basis
for damages the exploitation for profit or trade purposes in Utah of the name, picture or portrait of an individual. It makes the private life, reputation, name,
picture or portrait of an individual a right or interest
which may not be invaded, exploited or capitalized by
others without written consent, as announced in the
above cases.
The Utah statute states that plaintiff may recover
for "any injuries" that may result from the violation
thereof. Clearly, on the face of this statute there is
nothing which limits damages to those arising in a particular way; to the contrary, the express statement is
that recovery can be allowed for any damages which
plaintiff can show and prove. It may well be that in a
particular case one type of damage would be incompatible with another (see discussion in 28 Harvard Law
Review 889); it may be that certain types of damage can
be recoverable under another legal ground as well (e.g.
libel, Peek v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185; Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 662; 134 S. W. 1076, 1080); but
this does not justify an arbitrary declaration that what
is probably the most usual ground for recovery is excluSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sive and that other grounds are without the statute-i.e.,
compensation for the commercial use of plaintiff's name.
It has been said that the doctrine of privacy covers
three different types of injuries ( 31 Texas Law Rev. 82;
28 H. L. R. 689). Among these appear both the injury
to one's feelings, and exploitation for a commercial purpose of a person's name {31 Texas Law Rev. 82), or
more succinctly, an interest in property (28 H. L. R. 689).
The latter may be involved where the person exploited
had treated his name as having pecuniary value, particularly if this was the case by virtue of his business
or profession, as in the case of Donahue.
Thus, Colt, J., stated:
''Independently of the question of contract I
believe the law to be that a private individual has
a right to be protected in the representation of
his portrait in any form; that this is a property as
well as a personal right; and that it belongs to
the same class of rights which forbids the reproduction of a private manuscript or painting or
the publication of private letters or a lecture delivered by a teacher to his class, or the revelation
of the contents of a merchant's books by a clerk
... '' Corliss v. Walker, 64 F. 280. (Emphasis
added)
As was stated in the Texas Law Review:
''Where the plaintiff is a public personage and
his name or picture is appropriated for an advertisement, the measure of damages should be its
reasonable value for advertising purposes. Where
a person's history is exploited, as in the instant
54
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case, the damages should be the value of that
history for the purpose in 'vhich it was employed
... And, of course, in addition to such damages,
the plaintiff should also be allowed to recover
for any humiliation or mental suffering caused
by the defendant ... " (31 Texas Law Rev. 82)
It has been urged that in the case of an action by a
living person that the right of property and of feelings
are not compatible and cannot be jointly claimed, (28
H. L. R. 689) it being felt that a property right presupposes prior publicity which under circumstances may
constitute a waiver of any action for injured feelings.
It is submitted that the better view is that the two
can co-exist and that it is a question of degree. As the
Tenth Circuit has stated in this case:
''By becoming a public figure one may relinquish in part right of privacy which would be his
under other circumstances ... The right may be
waived completely or only in part. It may be
waived for one purpose, and still be asserted for
another. But the existence of the waiver carries
with it the right to invade the right of privacy of
the individual only to the extent legitimately
necessary and proper in dealing with the matter
which gave rise to the waiver. The question
whether a person is a public figure and therefore
has waived in part his right of privacy may rest
upon various and variable facts and circumstances. And no rule of thumb has been evolved for
its easy solution in all cases." (Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 Fed. 2d at 12-13)
However, such questions of fact, varying with every
case, would be pertinent only in a case where waiver is
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shown for the particular purpose as hereafter discussed
under another heading. Even those who urge an essential incompatibility admit that "Whether the interest,
and consequently the right, is one of substance or of
personality must be considered from the standpoint of
the individual injured." (28 H. L. R. 689) As such the
presence of a right of property or of personality can
only be determined when all of the facts are in. There
is no dispute that right of property cam,, in some cases,
and in this case did, exist.
Utah's statute is sufficiently unique to avoid these
problems, for it greatly extends the scope of even similar
statutes to allow recovery by the immediate heirs of a
deceased person. This is the case before us.
The property right is created by the activities of
the decedent during his lifetime. It results wholly from
his own actions, and has no relation to the feelings of
his heirs. This property right may be made more concrete, and easier of financial estimate, as it was in this
case, in plaintiffs' proferred amendment to their complaint where they allege damages for inability to market
a certain manuscript, but the fact remains that plaintiffs are suing on a value the right to which is created
by statute.
Thus, in cases such as this where the heirs are bringing the action, rights of personality and property are
not exclusive, for they do not stem from the same source.
Jack Donahue could not have waived damages for injury
to his ·heirs' feelings if he had wished.
56
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It is thus submitted that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow plaintiffs to sue for injury to their
right of property.
The mistake that the trial court made was in misapplying one feature of the law of privacy as announced
by some courts, where a similar statute was not involved,
to this case. The statute should h'ave been recognized as
an adoption by Utah of the broader view of the right
and given full application in accordance with its language. This is an action imposing a tort liability for
violation of the terms of the statute, which defendants
admittedly did.
The portion of the Utah statute banning use by
others of the name, portrait or picture of another for
advertising or trade purposes is to be found in the
statutes of only two other states, New York and Virginia.
We gain some assistance from New York decisions; also
from the basic underlying principles that the statute
obviously intended to adopt the principles announced in
the foregoing cases that one may not reap the financial
harvest of another's life, name and reputation, without
written permission so to do.
Within the State of Utah an individual's name, portrait and picture are by statute made a right which is
his to hold and have during his lifetime and to leave to
his heirs when he dies. That it is a valuable right is
plainly evident from the facts )n the instant case. Jack
Donahue was a famous dancer, actor and entertainer.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

57

He was, during his lifetime, the foremost in his profession-akin to present-day celebrities. His fame and
popularity attracted the public to his performances. The
same may be said of Marilyn Miller, with whom he
teamed in some of his productions. Warner Brothers
now seek, for their own enrichment, and to the exclusion
of his heirs, to gain the benefit of that reputation and
popularity by reenacting scenes from some of the plays
in which he appeared, including some with Miss Miller,
and by :fictionally portraying what they regard as incidents in his life, under his own name. Such exploitation
and fictional misrepresentation of an individual's life
for trade or advertising (commercial) purposes, without
permission so to do, is the thing that the statute is intended to stop and to make actionable in damages.
The proper interpretation of the Utah statute makes
injury to feelings or personal distress from undesired
publicity one, but only one, element in the damage action.
The other, and more far reaching damage, is the financial
loss from unauthorized and unpermitted exploitation
and commercialization in Utah of the name, picture or
portrait which deprives the individual or his heirs of
the :financial value of the name and reputation which he
has built up at great effort and expense and enables another to reap the financial harvest of the efforts and
reputation of others. This commercialization occurred
in Utah.
It was by failure of the trial court to recognize this
broader view of the Utah statute that it '\\ras led to make
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its erroneous ruling in this case. Exploitation and commercialization of the name of Jack Donahue within the
State of Utah for financial gain and profit within the
State of Utah, without permission of plaintiffs, IS an
accepted and admitted fact in this case.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Brown
Chemical Co. vs. Mayer, 139 U.S. 540, 35 L. Ed. 247, says:
''A man's name is his own property arnd he has the sam.e
right to its ~tSe and enjoyment as he has to that of amy
other species of property.''
In Uproar vs. National Broadcasting Co., 81 Fed.
2d 373, affirming the same case in 8 Fed Supp. 358, the
name was recognized as a property right which could
be licensed out and the right to use of which could be
assigned.
Dean Prosser, in his work on Torts, at page 1056
has the following to say on this subject:
''The greater number of privacy cases, however, have involved the appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use. The typical case is that of the unauthorized use of his picture in the defendant's advertising. Although the protection of his personal
feelings is still highly important in such a case,
the right invaded has also a commercial value. It
is perhaps futile to argue "\vhether it is to be called
a 'property' right on the ground that if the law
will protect it the defendant will be compelled to
pay the plaintiff for the privilege of using the
picture, since that might be true of any other
protected right. There is at least a commercial
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benefit to the defendant through the appropria. tion of an exclusive asset of the plaintiff. The
mere use of a name similar to that of the planiti:ff
is probably never actionable in itself, since in the
absence of a statute a person may be given or
assume any name he likes; but where the name
is tied up and identified with other aspects of his
personality, such as his reputation in business, or
incidents in his life, and its use amounts to an
appropriation of such values, recovery frequently
has been permitted. ''
The trial court adopted the same view as was taken
by the majority opinion in the Roberson case, which was
repudiated by the New York Legislature·by adoption of
the statute and of which the American Law Journal said
in Vol. 36, page 636 :
''The decision under review shocks and wounds
the ordinary sense of justice of mankind. We have
heard it alluded to only by terms of regret."
It is no wonder the New York Legislature acted as
soon as it could.
\Ve respectfully submit that the trial court adopted
an archaic rule of law not the view that should recognize
the vast value of a name which our statute \\·as intended
to protect against use and exploitation by others \vithout
written consent.
That the name had a value i'or purpoNes of exploitation by defendants is manifest from its selP('tion for
use. Plaintiffs did not offer their t~vidence as to the
value of the name bee a use the trial court had already,
GO
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by refusing permission to a1nend the complaint, denied

them that right. By combining the name of the deceased
star with the impersonation by a living star, the defendants received double value, one for v.rhich they paid (the
living star) and one which they received gratis (the
deceased star) if the trial court's view of the la.w is
adhered to in this case.
We may even go farther and say that the one star
need not be deceased if the trial court's view is correct.
The statute makes no difference between the living and
the dead excepting as to who has the right to the cause
of action. If, under our law, they can use the name of
the deceased Jack Donahue, they can do the same with
any living individual. This flies in the very teeth of our
statute and the common law right of name and privacy.
When our lawmakers said that the name of living
and deceased individuals could not be used for advertising or trade purposes without the consent of the individual if living or of his heirs or personal representatives
if deceased, without their consent, they intended to
protect all non-consenting individuals not only from
adverse and humiliating injury to their feelings and sensibilities by reason of things that hurt inwardly, but
also to secure to them the values which have been created
by making the name a valuable asset, however it be considered.
Under the decided cases there seems little doubt
that the name of an individual is a valuable right, the
value of which he creates through his activities. He may
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protect it against commercial exploitation by others, or
he may by license, contract or other means, permit others
to make use of it. It is his to have and to hold or to do
with as he pleases. The fact remains that it is a property
right of his, and his only. True he cannot stop others
from having the same or a similar name. The only question is as to the nature of the right and whether it is
protected by the statute conferring the cause of action
on the heirs.
The effect of the trial court's ruling in this case is to
emasculate, amend and annul the statute and adopt the
law of the majority opinion in the Roberson case which
the statute was enacted to repudiate. All authorities who
have considered the subject agree that no court would
now follow the law that was announced in the majority
opinion in the Roberson case, but the trial court did. It
is universally condemned as unsound, regardless of
statute. Our State repudiated it by legislative enactment.
We have high regard for the rights of our citizens, both
great and small. It would be most unfortunate if by
judicial legislation the door were opened to commercial
exploitation of the names, pictures, or portraits of
church, civic, political and pioneer leaders whose picturesque and eventful lives are so inviting for box office
appeal and commercial exploitation, and particularly so
if fictionalized with the magic touch of the imagination
of the scenario writer. They could really dra'v the
throngs if this court permits itself to say that this statute
does not mean what it says. It is a matter of the most
serious concern.
()2
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POINTS 10 (e) (f) and 27.
THE FACT THAT JACK DONAHUE WAS A
DECEASED PUBLIC ENTERTAINER DID NOT
JUSTIFY DEFENDANTS IN USING HIS NAME
FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE IN UTAH IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE, PARTICULARLY BY
FICTIONALIZING HIS LIFE.
The trial court set forth the principles for which
we contend in its instructions No. 5 and 6 as follows :
"INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"You are instructed that by the laws of the
State of Utah it is unlawful for any person to use
for purposes of trade or for advertising purposes
the name, portrait or picture of any. person, if
living, without first having obtained the written
consent of such person, or if such person is dead,
without having obtained the written consent of
the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased person.
"It is further a part of the laws of the State
of Utah that the heirs or personal representatives
of any deceased person, whose name, portrait or
picture is used within the State of Utah for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, without the written consent first having been obtained
as above set forth may maintain an action against
such person or persons so using the name, picture
or portrait to recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use, and, if the defendant or defendants shall have knowingly used
such person's name, portrait or picture in such
unlawful manner, exemplary or punitive damages
may be awarded in addition to the actual damages.
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"You are further instructed that in this case,
it is undisputed in the evidence that the motion
picture, 'Look for the Silver Lining', was exhibited in the State of Utah; that the name Jack
Donahue was used as the name of the principal
male actor therein; that Jack Donahue was the
husband of the plaintiff Alice Donahue and the
father of the other named plaintiffs. Such being
the case, you are instructed that the plaintiffs are
the heirs of Jack Donahue and are entitled to
institute this action.''

"INSTRUCTION NO. 6
"The Utah statute does not undertake to restrict or forbid the publication of matters essentially educational or informative or strictly biographical in character, and is not to be so construed. It does, however, forbid the appropriation of the name, picture or representation of the
personality of an individual for commercial purposes, or for purposes of trade, and the fact that
Jack Donahue was a public figure to the extent
and in the way indicated, would not give the defendants the right to dramatize his life in a motion
picture based primarily upon fiction and the
imaginative. You should understand that the fact
that some facts of his life are correctly portrayed
does not prevent your determining that on the
whole the motion picture is based primarily upon
fiction and the imaginative and that such facts as
are correctly portrayed are so interwoven with
fiction as to present a distorted and untrue fictional result as a 'vhole.
"If, therefore, you shall find that the motion
picture is based essentially upon fiction or the
imaginative and designed primarily to entertain
and amuse an audienee desiring entertainment,
then your Yerdict should be for plaintiffs and you
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should proceed to assess the damages in accordance with the instructions relating thereto."
Had the matter so remained the jury would have
had some idea. as to the applicable law. However, the
trial court did not so leave the matter. It then proceeded
to confuse the issue by giving contradictory instructions
on the subject matter of the effect of fictionalization as
applied to public figures, and by setting forth in instruction No. 13, in effect, that the jury might take into
account the extent, if any, that plaintiffs had waived
their rights and the extent to which J a.ck Donahue had
waived their rights, during his lifetime, by becoming a
public figure. Even these contradictory pronouncements
were thrown overboard by the trial court in its Declaratory Judgment to the effect that the Utah statute does
not apply at all to deceased public figures so far as the
movie industry is concerned.
Let us see if we can clarify the problem and arrive
at a correct solution.
Defendants contend that Jack Donahue was a deceased public figure and that by becoming a public figure
he had relinquished to the public, i~cluding defendants,
his rights to be immune from publicity and exploitation
for the purposes complained of in this case. The trial
court adopted this view in its Declaratory Judgment and
in effect so stated in its Instruction No. 13.
Under the common law of privacy a public figure
undoubtedly waives his rights as to certain types of
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publicity and public comment. But the waiver IS not
unlimited and absolute for all purposes. Even public
figures, by becoming such, do not open the door to commercial exploitation of their names, pictures and portraits. No one knows that better than these defendants.
They are dealing continuously with public figures in the
entertainment world. If by becoming famous the door
were opened to commercial exploitation of the name,
picture or portrait of all famous individuals without
their consent, famous people would by their own popularity destroy the values they create. The door is opened
only as to proper comment, discussion and consideration
of the activities they make public. Opening the door for
one purpose does not open the door for all purposes.
Our statute does not say by express provision or by
implication that public individuals are excluded from
the protection against commercial exploitation by others
which it affords. Use for purposes of trade or commercial exploitation is the offense.
The trial court correctly stated one phase of the
law on this subject in its Instruction No. 7 to the jury
in the following language:
"You are instructed that in this case the
truthfulness or verity of the facts or incidents
depicted in the picture as having occurred during
the lifetime of Jack Donahue is no defense to this
action. The Utah statute involved in this case
prohibits use of the name, picture or portrait of
a deceased person for purposes of trade or advertising without the written consent of his heirs.
The purpose of the statute was to prohibit the

66

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exploitation for purposes of trade the name, picture, professional standing, or reputation of an
individual without written consent of the person,
or his heirs if deceased.''
This 'vas fine; but the trial court proceeded to contradict itself in that regard by stating in its instructions
No. 2 and 3 that it was essential to plaintiffs' cause of
action that they establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the motion picture was essentially fictional
or imaginative, thereby in effect stating that if it were
truthful it would be 01(, even though it be for commercial
exploitation or purposes of trade. The trial court in instruction No. 2 said that if plaintiffs did not prove that
the picture was fictional and imaginative defendants
would be entitled to recover.
This is exactly the opposite of what the trial court
told the jury. He said in instruction No.7 that the truth
(factual) was no defense. He said in instructions No. 2
and 3 that unless it was fictional we could not recover.
Now he says in the Declaratory Judgment that it doesn't
make any difference whether it was factual or fictional.
Either one, we have no cause of action. Having no clear
idea of the law, the trial court first stated the law correctly, then undid it, and then misstated the law completely in its Declaratory Judgment. It is no wonder
the jury was confused when the court was not clear in
pronouncing the applicable law.
The court there says in so many words that in order
for the film to come within the protection of the statutb
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it must be :fictional or imaginative. Such is not the law.
Commercial exploitation of the name, picture or portrait
of another is unlawful regardless of the verity or truthfulness.
If it was necessary for plaintiffs to prove fictionalization in order to recover as stated in instructions No.
2 and 3, then truthful depiction for commercial purposes
would be a. defense. The two instructions are contradictory and destructive of each other.
The court says in instruction No. 3 that if the picture is essentially educational or informative that it is
protected by the con.stitutional guarantees with reference
to freedom of speech and press; and clearly implies in
that instruction that unless it is fictional or imaginative
it is so protected.
Neither the State nor Federal Constitution says any
such thing. Neither constitution is involved in this case,
as herein elsewhere discussed. Under those provisions
of the Constitutions the press may disseminate the news
and freemen may speak their minds and opinions with
reference to public individuals and public questions and
they may provide their own entertainment without prior
censorship; but this does not mean that they may not be
held liable for invasion of the rights of others if they
go beyond that protection. Newspapers and motion pictures have no more right to violate the law or privacy
or exploit the name, pi(·ture or portrait of au individual
for commercial purposes than any other citizen.
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The uncontradicted evidence showed that it was just
as fictional as the amended complaint alleged and as ¥rs.
Donahue and her daughters testified. No one testified
to the contrary. The testimony of the expert witnesses
went only to an attempted justification of fictionalization
on artistic, educational and biographical grounds. They
did not deny the fictionalization, did not deny its extent
as given by Mrs. Donahue and as alleged in the amended
complaint. Defendants admitted it in the allegations of
their counterclaim for a. declaratory judgment. They
say it ''ras in part fictional, but the only truthful part
was as stated in the amended complaint, viz., that he
was a famous dancer, comedian, entertainer and author;
he did play with Marilyn Miller in two shows, "Sonny"
and "Rosalie", and he was the foremost actor of his
type. The rest was fictional, just as the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated would constitute a cause of
action under the statute.
In its instructions to the jury the trial court in
effect left it to the jury to decide whether the picture
was educational or informative (biographical) and said
that if it was plaintiffs could not recover. This was not
a jury question in this case. The use to which the name
was put was the question, and on this issue the fact was
undisputed. In its Declaratory Judgment the trial court
took a different view of the law. There is complete conflict between the two pronouncements of the trial court
on this subject. The trial court was in error on both
pronouncements. On the undisputed facts it should have
been a law question for the court. If the law was as
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announced by the court in its Declaratory Judgment it
should have granted the motion of defendants for a
dismissal of the case at the close of plaintiffs' evidence.
If it was not, it should have directed a verdict for plaintiffs, leaving only the matter of damages to the jury.
The evidence of defendants added nothing to the facts
of the case. It was directed entirely to opinion and
argument as to the use to which the film might be made.
The facts were undisputed. The nature of the film, the
purpose and nature of the exhibitions were not contradicted or varied by the opinion evidence, which will be
discussed elsewhere herein.
No one from Warner Brothers, either the company
that made it or the company that exhibited it, testified
in this case. No one testified that it was created or
exhibited as a biography, which it was not, or as a newsreel, or for educational purposes. It was a commercial
film exhibited for what it would bring as a box office
attraction for the financial gain of the maker, distributor
and exhibitors.
The most that can be said for the opinion evidence
of the so-called experts is that it is a film that could be
used to show to students for their entertainment or to
show them fancy dance steps or dramatic appeal; that
it was a showing of how music and dramatic art were
produced by great stars of the 1920's and 1930's; and
that it did deal with what was purported to be the doings
of two deceased stars, fictionalized to increase the appeal.
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This is not what the freedom of press and speech
provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions have
exeluded from the legislative power of enactment.
News events, whether contained in newspapers,
newsreels put out by the motion picture industry or
pictorial magazines are protected.
True biographies of famous individuals, living and
deceased, are protected.
Educational matter prepared and distributed for
use in educational institutions for purposes of instruction may be protected. We will not argue the point. No
such use is involved here.
The fact that someone in the process of creating or
distributing such material for those purposes may make
or hope to make financial gain is beside the point. It is
the nature of the product and the purpose of its use that
determines the protection to which it is entitled.
The decided cases leave no doubt as to where the
protection ends and liability commences. The case at
bar, on the undisputed facts, is in the liability group.
Webster defines a biography as the written history
of the life of a person.
Aside from the fact that Jack Donahue was a famous
dancer and actor and he did appear with Marilyn Miller
in two shows, ' ' Sonny'' and ''Rosalie'', the balance of
the movie, ''Look for the Silver Lining'' depicting the
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life of Jack Donahue was wholly fictional and untrue
both as to fact and character of person. Even the scenes
purportedly taken from those shows were not accurately
portrayed and the impersonation of Jack Donahue by
the present film star, Ray Bolger, was exactly the opposite from Jack Donahue's personality.
It was just about as much a biography as though
they were to make a movie called ''The Great Pioneer''
and have someone therein portray the part of Brigham
Young but having him act like Jim Bridger or some of
the other mountain men. If they had done that while
Brigham Young was alive or while some of his sons or
daughters were alive, would this court, with this statute
on the books, have said that it was a biographical play
because it was a true depiction of life in the wide open
spaces at that time~ That is what the trial court said
in this case, and that is the full import of what the socalled experts said. No doubt such a play or movie
would have had great box office appeal, particularly
outside of Utah, and they probably could have had plenty
of educators and literary critics available to testify that
it was fit for students to see in their leizure time ; and
it probably would have had the approval of some societies
and scholars of western history. They could well have
said with experts in this case, ''The fictionalizing didn't
hurt it. There was an accurate depiction of life among
the Pioneers and the students would have seen therein
what the professors call 'dramatic effect', so that they
could learn how to ere ate 'mass appeal'.''
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The cases say that fictionalization to this extent
creates liability and finds no justification in the law.
In Binns vs. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y.S.
51, 103 N.E. 1108, 1110 L. R. A. 1915 C 839, the New York
Court said:
''The series of pictures were not true pictures
of a current event but mainly a product of the
imagination, based, however, largely upon such
information relating to an actual occurrence as
could readily be obtained. * * * The use of the
name and picture of the plaintiff by the defendant
in the picture films, and pursuant to leases .and
agreements with the defendant in the moving picture shows, was commercial. Such use was in the
language of the opinion in the Roberson case 'for
his (its) own selfish purposes'.''
The court further said :
''It is not designed to instruct or educate those
who saw it. The defendant used the plaintiff's
alleged picture to amuse those who paid to be
entertained. If the use of the plaintiff's name and
picture as shown in this case is not within the
terms of the statute, then the picture of an individual could be similarly made and exhibited
for the purpose of showing his peculiarities as of
dress and walk, and his personal fads, eccentricities, amusements and even his private life. By
such pictures an audience would be amused and
the maker of the films and exhibitors would be
enriched. The greater the exaggeration in such a
series of pictures, so long as they were not libelous, the greater would be the profit of the picture
maker and exhibitor.
''We hold that the name and picture of the
plaintiff were used by the defendant as a matter
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of business and profit and contrary to the prohibitions of the statute.
' 'It is urged that there is danger of serious
trouble in the practicable enforcement of any rule
which may be adopted in construing and enforcing the statute so far as it relates to purposes of
trade. If there is any basis for the suggestion of
danger in enforcing a part of the statute under
consideration, it is the duty of the Legislature to
repeal such part thereof, or so modify it as to
define with greater particularity which it intends
should be prohibited, or perhaps permit the use
of a person's name, portrait or picture for purposes of trade if the oral assent of such person,
or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian,
is obtained therefor."
In the case of Krieger vs. Popular Publications, 3
N.Y.S. (2d) 480, the complaint alleged, among other
things, that the defendant "without first having obtained
the written consent of the plaintiff knowingly used the
name of the plaintiff within the State of New York for
purposes of trade and for advertising purposes''. The
court stated therein:

"It has been held for example that the use of
plaintiff's name and picture in connection with
the dissemination of news or the depicting of current events is a legitimate use under the statute
(Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S.
752) but not where there has been a dramatization
of an actual event using the name and likeness of
a person who played an important role therein.
(Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y.S.
51, 103 N.E. 1108.)
"In the present case there is nothing indicated
that the story attacked describes a current event
74
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or is of such g·eneral ne,vs interest or imparts
such information as to come within the allowable
area of the statute. On the contrary, it may be
reasonably inferred from the complaint that it is
fiction. .I\s such it would come within the class of
cases in which a recovery may be had. Sarat
Lahiri Y. Daily lVIirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 162
niisc. 776.
"'
"It is true
that with respect to fiction, recovery
has been denied, where in a novel of almost 400
pages the name of the plaintiff was used but once,
(Damron v. Doubleday Doren & Co., Inc., 231
N.Y.S. 444, affirmed 226 App. Div. 796, 234 N.Y.S.
773) ; and in a 9ase 'vhere the full name o{ the
plaintiff (with middle initial omitted) appeared
'only in the cast of characters' of a book of unusual leng-th without any parallels between the
plaintiff and the character depicted in the book.
(Swacker v. Wright, 277 N.Y.S. 296.)"

In the case of Sidis v. F. R. Publishing Corporation,
113 Fed. (2) 806, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, said:
"In this context, it is clear that 'for purposes
of trade' does not contemplate the publication of
a newspaper, magazine or book which imparts
truthfully news or other factual information to
the public. Although a publisher sells a commodity and expects to profit from the sale of his
product he is immune from the interdict of Sections 50 and 51 so long as he confines himself to
the unembroidered dissemination of facts. Publishers and motion picture producers have occasionally been held to transgress the statutes in
New York but in each case the factual presentation was embellished by some degree of fictional-
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''The New Yorker's articles limit themselves
to the unvarnished, unfictionalized truth.''
In the case of Koussevitzky vs. Allen, Towne &
Heath, Inc., et al., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S. (2) 779, the
court said:
"The right of privacy statute does not apply
to unauthorized biography for a public figure unless the biography is fictional or novelized in
character.''
In the case of Malony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc.,
98 N.Y.S. (2) 119, plaintiff brought action under the
right of privacy statute because of the portrayal of
plaintiff by Independent Comic Magazine as a hero in
an airplane disaster at the Empire State Building in
which plaintiff was a national figure. The Supreme
Court found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed
to the Appellate Division which reversed the case and
held that there was no violation of Sections 50 and 51.
The plaintiff was the most celebrated hero of the disaster. The defendant published in a magazine five pages
of pictures which were not actual photographs but were
symbolic sketches. The script was taken from the newspaper accounts of the tragedy at the time. The defendant
appealed from the judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that the account in his magazine was a true narration of an event of general interest in which plaintiff
had been widely and prominently featured in the public
press. The court said:
"It does not follow that plaintiff's exploit has
been fictionalized merely for the reason that it has
7()
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been told through a form of picture writing which
is as old as the human rare.
''The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to
establish his cause of action 'vhich means that it
is encumbent upon him to show that the article
is based upon fiction rather than fact. * * * Only
in minor particulars has plaintiff shown inaccuracy.''
The majority opinion of the court in discussing this
. point at page 10 of the Decision used the following
language:
"While the fact that one is a public figure does
not, in our opinion, ·take him outside the statute
or justify the commercial exploitation of his personality, such as the publication of his picture in
connection with an advertisement of a commodity,
it may create such a legitimate public interest
"\Yith respect to him and his public career that a
biography of his life, not fictional nor novelized
although published or portrayed without his consent, shall be regarded as informative and educational in character and the publication thereof as
not constituting commercial exploitation.''
If this correctly states the law, by what test is it
to be determined that the purported biography is fictional or novelized and who is to determine that fact 1
If the facts are not in dispute, as in this case, it is a la'v
question for the court. If the facts are disputed it is a
jury question under clear and uncontradictory instructicns.
Instead of bringing witnesses to testify that the
picture "Tas actually a biography of Jack Donahue, which
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it obviously was not, or that it was put out for educati"lnal purposes, which it certainly was not, or that it
"as a news item relating to a deceased individual who
bad attained fame, which it was not, they drew a red
herring across the path of the trial judge and jury by
bringing in a group of individuals to testify as to the
Rducational, biographical and informative value of the
:film for purposes other than the purpose for which it
was actually made and for uses other than the use to
which it was actually put. This was done over objection
of plaintiffs. It had the desired effect.
The obvious purpose was to draw the attention of
the trial court and jury from the use that was actually
made of the :film and the purpose for which it was actually
produced to uses and purposes which might be made.
The constitutional question, if such there was, in this
connection, should have been for the court, not the jury,
upon the undisputed facts. The purpose, of course, was
to over-awe or overwhelm the court and jury which would
result from a proper interpretation of the law.
If the legislature intended the statute to have no
application to movies, etc., or to biographical novels or
to matters that are educational in the sense that all experiences in life are educational, one way or another, it
is for the Utah legislature to amend the statute to make
the exclusion. Until it does so these cases should he
decided within the framework of the statute in the light
of applicable decided cases.
78
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This phase of the question was amply considered
and decided in the case by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. It is a case directly in point in this case.
Under the New York Statute, the cases are clear
that as long as a person lives who is not a famous person
or public character, you cannot invade his right of
privacy by making his private life public in any way.
The only limitation upon portraying the life of a
famous person is that you must tell the truth about the
facts of his life-you cannot fictionalize by drawing out
of your own wild imagination and attribute those wild
imaginings to the life of that public or famous person.
When a man runs for public office, he invites the
public whose favor he seeks to examine his whole life's
record to determine his fitness for the public office and
all the incidents of his private life become public.
When a man becomes famous for other reasons, not
because he is running for public office, the facts of his
life for which he has become famous, then become more
or less public property and as to those incidents in his
life, the right of privacy seems to be a misnomer. But
he is fully protected by the New York statute and the
Utah statute and by judicial decisions without statute
against untruths and against using his name for advertising, commercial and trade purposes and the New York
decisions are unanimous and without dissent on this
point. Neither can you fictionalize his life.
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Falsehood and untruths about the life of any man,
whether living or dead, are not educational and informative, neither do they add to the cuture of society.
If the Declaratory Judgment is sound then there
would be no law of privacy in this State, nor could any
protective statute be enacted so far as the movie industry
is concerned. Under that theory the authors and moving
picture producers determine the law of privacy and not
the legislature or the courts. Under that theory any
person who has been prominent loses his name and it
becomes public property in spite of himself, to do with
it as the public pleases, to be fictionalized, exploited for
profit, misrepresented, distorted, used for commercial,
advertising and trade purposes. The Utah Statute means
what it says and under it, a man's name cannot be used
for these purposes.
A famous man's name may be used and a true biography of him written, but in using his name and writing
his biography the Utah statute requires t~at you must
tell the truth about him and not fictionalize about him
and not use his name for exploitation, advertising and
trade purposes. Biographers should not be permitted
to fictionalize, which is another way of saying they should
not be allo"\\red to create a new person out of their own
vivid imaginings.
Moving picture companies make such pictures as
the Donahue picture for profit only and they will make
and sell anything that ""ill make money for them. It is
80
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not educational and informative. It is not cultural. It is
plain dollars and cents with them-commercial profit.
Educational pictures are made mainly for schools
and colleges and are almost never financially successful
and p~ofita ble. Warner Bros. did not make this picture
for such purpose. They make pictures for profit only
and in order to make profit they must fictionalize their
subjects where they use the names of real persons. The
lives of people, even though they may .become famous,
are in the minds of scenario writers too drab for profit.
Such lives must be fictionalized and exaggerated and as
the court said in the Binns case, 210 N.Y.S. 51; 103 N. E.
1108 : ''The greater the exaggeration . . . the greater
would be the profit of the picture maker and exhibitors.''
May we briefly summarize our understanding of the
law on this point: Under ·our statute and under the
common law relating to privacy if the actual use is .for
purposes of trade the truth is no defense and it makes
no difference whether the victim is famous or not. Fictionalization is material only on the question of damages.
If the use is not for purposes of trade but it is contended
that the use "ras as a news item, fictionalization destroys
that purported defense. If it is contended that the use
was for biographical purposes or as a part of the educational system, fictionalization destroys that purported
defense.
The trial court in this case correctly stated the law
in its instructions 5, 6, and 7; then destroyed what it had
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said by instructing the jury in its instructions 2 and 3
that unless we showed that it was :fictional we could not
recover; and in the Declaratory Judgment went all the
way, which was certainly erroneous.
POINTS 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 24, 25 and 26
THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 76-4-8 and 9
TO THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXHIBITION FOR
PURPOSES OF TRADE OF FEATURE MOTION
PICTURES SIMILAR TO ''LOOK FOR THE SILVER
LINING" DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH STATE AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
The constitutional question entered the pictures in
three ways:
(a) The provisions in the declaratory judgment to
the effect that the Utah statute has no applicability to
exhibition of the picture by defendants in the manner
and for the purposes alleged, by reason of the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of press and speech.
{b) The evidence of the expert witnesses produced
by defendants as to the nature of the picture as having
educational and biographical value.
(c) The court's instructions relating to the statute
as limited by the constitutional provisions.
82
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Appellants respectfully urge that the trial court
'vas in error in its conception of the constitutional question as it applied the same in all three particulars.
In the first place the constitutional question was one
of la"~ for the court. In the second place, it had nothing
to do 'vith the case under the undisputed facts. In the
third place, the court should not have admitted expert
witnesses to testify as to the educational or biographical
nature of the picture; and in the fourth place the court
improperly instructed the jury that the Utah statute
would not be violated if the picture was educational or
biographical in character by reason of the constitutional
provisions relating to freedom of speech and press.
The trial court was misled by and misinterpreted
the effect of cases recently decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States, holding that the movie industry
is entitled to the protection of the constitutional provisions relating to freedom of the press and that States
may not censor their product in advance of showing.
There should have been nothing about those cases which
should have led the trial court to make the rulings which
it made.
Defendants pleaded in their answer that the Utah
statute, if applied to uses of this type, would be in violation of the Federal and State constitutions relating
to freedom of speech and press.
The question was argued to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals and directly answered by that court.
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It was again argued to Judge Martin Larson on preliminary motion under the pleadings, who ruled (R. 68)
that the statute does not violate the constitutional provisions as applied to the case at bar. In the trial of the
case Judge Van Cott took the view that it was a jury
question and then in the declaratory judgment ruled
that the defendants, under the constitutions, had an
absolute right to use the name and exhibit the picture
in the manner shown.
Defendants asserted below, and the trial court's
paragraph 3 of its declaratory judgment holds, that the
publication or exhibition of this picture, or similar
feature pictures, because of its biographical, educational
or informative values, was protected by the freedom of
speech and press provisions of the Utah State and United
States Constitutions.
In its instructions to the jury the trial court stated
the la-'v one way, leaving it to the jury to decide, and in
its declaratory judgment the trial court took a different
view of the la,v. There is complete conflict between the
two pronouncements of the trial court on this subject.
The trial court was in error on both pronouncements.
On the undisputed facts it should have been a law question for the court. If the law was as announced by th{:\
court in its declaratory judgment it should have granted
the motion of defendants for a dismissal of thP case at
the close of plaintiffs' evidence. If it was not, it should
have directed a verdict for plaintiffs, leaving only thP
matter of damages to the jury. The evidence of defend-
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ants added nothing to the facts of the case. It was
directed entirely to opinion and argument. The facts
'vere undisputed. The nature of the film, the purpose
and nature of the exhibitions were not contradicted or
varied by the opinion evidence, which will be discussed
elsewhere herein.
No one from Warner Brothers, either the company
that made it or the company that exhibited it, testified
in this case. No one testified that it was. created or
exhibited as a. biography, which it "\Vas not, or as a newsreel, or for educational purposes. It "\Vas a commercial
film exhibited for what it would bring as a box office
attraction for the financial gain of the maker, distributor
and exhibitors.
The most that can be said for the opinion evidence
of the so-called experts is that it, as a film, has educational value within the broad definition of education that
everything is educational in one way or another, and
that it could be used to show to students for their entertainment or to show them fancy dance steps or dramatic
appeal; that it could be used in educational institutions
to show how music and dramatic art were produced by
great stars of the 1920's and 1930's; and that it did deal
with what was purported to be the doings of two deceased
stars, fictionalized to increase the appeal.
This is not what the freedom of press and speech
provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions have
excluded from the legislative power of enactment.
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News events, whether contained in newspapers,
newsreels put out by the motion picture industry or pictorial magazines, are protected.
Humiston v. Universal Film Exchange, infra.
True biographies of famous individuals, living and
deceased, are protected.
Sidis v. F-R Publication Co., 113 Fed. 2d 806.
Educational matter prepared and distributed for
use in educational institutions for purposes of instruction may be protected.
While it has been recognized that motion pictures
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the 1st and 14th amendments,
U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 92 Law
Ed. 1260
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 96 Law Ed. 1098
they are not sancrosanct. As said by the court in Burstyn
v. Wilson,
''To hold that liberty of expression by means
of motion pictures is guaranteed by the 1st and
14th amendments, however, is not the end of our
problem. It does not follow that the constitution
requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion
picture of every kind at all times and at all
places.'' 343 U. S. 495, 502.
All that has been squarely decided by the Supreme
Court is that a State violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech and press if it bans a motion pi('t urP
86
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on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is "sacrilegious", Burstyn v. Wilson, supra, or that it is "of such
character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the
people''.
Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960, 96 Law Ed. 1359.
As stated by Mr. Justice Murphy for a unanimous
court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568,
571, 86 Law Ed. 1031, 1034:
''There are certain well defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which can never be thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the libelous and the insulting or
'fighting' words, those which by their very utterance inflict injuries or intend to incite an immediate breach of peace. ''
So, in the case at bar, if Warner Bros. and the other
defendants seek to profit by the commercialization of
the name and story of Jack Donahue, and by the invasion
of the privacy of his widow and children by a fictionalized
motion picture musical without their consent, they do so
at the risk of liability. No conflict with constitutional
freedom is made by the imposition of such liability.
The Circuit Court in the majority opinion pointed
this up succinctly in its ruling on the constitutional issue
raised by defendants in this very case:
"If the statute undertook to restrict or forbid
the publication of matters educational or informative or strictly biographical in character, or
the dissemination of news in the form of a newsSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reel or otherwise, it would be open to challenge
on the ground of objectionable restraint upon the
freedom of speech and press. But it does nothing
of the kind. It is content to forbid the appropriation of the name, picture, or personality of an
individual for commercial purposes, or for purposes of trade, as distinguished· from the publication of matters educational or informative or
purely biographical in kind, or the dissemination
of news in the form pf a newsreel or otherwise.
And the Constitutional guaranty of free speech
and free press in its full sweep does not undertake
to create an inviolate asylum for unbridled appropriation or exploitation of the name, picture, or
personality of a deceased public figure for purely
commercial purposes, or solely for purposes of
trade, with the state powerless to enact appropriate forbidding or remedial legislation.''
It has been shown that the .picture "Look for the
Silver Lining", and motion pictures like it, are not ne\YSreels or put out to disseminate news. While the "experts'' presented by defendants testified at great length
as to the picture's educational value, no one testified
that the use by defendants to which plaintiffs object, i.e.,
the commercial showing at motion picture theatres for
trade or profit, was for educational purposes, nor was it,
or are films similar to it, biographical in the sense of a
biography within the constitutional prot~ction.
Webster defines a biography as ''the written history
of a person's life''.
How the· picture might have been, or \vhat rutting
or other doctoring might make it useful for educational
or historical purposes, is not the issue in this case. Nor
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was it a proper issue as to what use might be made of
the picture. What the statute proscribes is the use of a
name for trade or profit and its use for trade or profit
in a commercial feature picture like ''Look for the Silver
I . ining" or other Warner Brothers musicals of the same
type, the use of which plaintiffs complain. It is submitted
that such proscription by the Utah statute is not in violation of either the Utah State or the Federal Constitutions.
The damage action was based upon the use actually
made of the name of Jack Donahue. Evidence as to uses
that might or could be made of the picture was beside
the issue and the court should have sustained the objection made by plaintiffs to such evidence.
Had we been suing one of the educational institutions for using the name in connection with exhibition
of the picture, the evidence of the experts as to the educational and biographical value of the film in connection
with its courses of instruction, or perhaps even its extracurricular activities, might have been germane to the
ISSUe.

Had we been seeking au injunction against licensing
the film for any and all purposes, the maker and distributor could undoubtedly have properly presented such evidence as a basis for exclusion of educational institutions
from operation of the injunctive process.
However, in this case, where the use actually made
was commercial, not only admitted but expressly alleged
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by defendants in their pleadings, the evidence as to what
uses might or could be made of the picture was beside
the issue.
Educational purposes, within the purview of the
constitutional provisions relating to freedom of speech,
are not broad and undefined, as described in the evidence
of Dr. Wheelwright, which included everything that affects the human mind, body and character. The educational uses which should come within the protective
features should be those which are a part of the activities
of educational institutions as such, where students are
taught in prescribed courses of study - the same standards as those prescribed for exemption from taxation.
Otherwise every activity of life would be an open field.
The cases and decisions on this subject as related to the
law of privacy leave no doubt as to the limitations beyond
which even movies, newspapers and broadcasters may
not go.
In fact the educational value of the film, as actually
used, was not a proper subject matter for the jury to
consider. Educational institutions as such are exempt
from taxation, but that does not mean that every activity
that is educational in nature is exempt. The courts have
limited that right to institutions created by la\v for such
purpose and where the proceeds derived from tuitions
and other revenues from their activities are retained by
the institutions and used exclusively for educational purposes.
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Lois Grunow Mem. Clinic v. Oglesby, 42 Ariz. 98,
22 Pac. 2d 1076:
''An educational institution has been judicially
defined as one which teaches and improves its
pupils; a school, seminary, college or educational
establishment." (Italics ours)
Educational institutions as such are generally immune from tort liability because, as was stated by this
court in the recent case of Bingham v. Board of Education of Ogden City, ______ Utah ______ , 223 Pac. 2d 432, in
providing education for students of school age the Board
of Education is performing a governmental function. As
such it is protected, said the court, by a provision of the
State constitution. Two Justices of this court felt that
the doctrine of immunity there announced was obsolete
and should be repudiated. If the doctrine announced by
the declaratory judgment and as set forth in instruction
No. 3 is correct, then the immunity is extended, under
the free press and speech provisions, to every establishment or agency that can show that its activities have
educational value or to which students may resort for
their entertainment without injury to their moral character.
The broad general objectives of education are set
forth in the Statutes of Utah. Students shall be taught
the constitution (Sec. 53-1-1); 'they shall be taught health,
citizenship, vocations, worthy use of leisure, worthy
home-membership, ethical character and the fundamental
processes or tools of education (Sec. 53-14-9); and in
doing so they incorporate the same into the regular
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courses of study and may make use of the usual means
of instruction, including ''visual education aids''. Does
this mean that every activity in life that accomplishes or
helps to accomplish any of those broad general principles
of splendid manhood or womanhood thereby becomes an
educational institution 1 The answer is so obvious as to
amount to the ludicrous.
The trial court gave to the jury no guide or definition to limit their thinking on this subject but simply
told them that if the picture had educational value the
Utah statute would not apply. The courts have gone to
no such end in their protection of education.
We submit that, the facts being undisputed, the
court should have rejected the evidence in the first place
in response to the objections interposed; should have
instructed the jury as a matter of law that the constitutional provisions had nothing to do with their deliberations on the damage side of this case.
Plaintiffs requested the trial court, in their request
No. 15, (R. 137) to give to the jury a proper guide as to
the meaning of the educational purposes referred to in
the law and that the use shown by the evidence in this
case would not constitute an educational use, but the
trial court refused that instruction to the jury and gave
no other guide for them in their deliberations. This was
error. It was prejudicial. If the issue was for the jury
at all, the court should have told them what the tt\rm
meant, as a legal proposition.
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POINT 10 (g)
THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF LAW QUESTION
RAISED IN THIS CASE AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ITS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN
DECREEING THAT THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES BE DETERMINED BY
THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF IN JURY TO PLAINTIFFS' FEELINGS.
The trial court assumed that there is a conflict of
la-\YS question in this action. It has declared that the
"applicable" conflict of laws rule requires that the rights
and liabilities of the parties be determined by the law
of the place where plaintiffs sustained injury and
damage to their feelings and sensibilities, viz., California.
This is equivalent to saying that in privacy cases no
cause of action lies in the State where the disclosure
occurs or where the name is used for commercial purposes unless the plaintiff is a resident of such State.
We submit that such is not the law, as it is not the law
in defamation and other actions involving personal rights
or property rights. The cause of action arises where the
tort is committed or the rights are violated.
This question was presented to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in this case and was answered in the
following language:
"It is well within the competence of Utah to
forbid commercial exploitation in that state of
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the kind alleged in the amended complaint and to
provide a remedy in its courts, without regard to
whether like exploitation had previously occurred
in another state in which no like remedy was afforded. Utah was not powerless to prohibit appropriation in that state of the name or picture of a
person for purposes of trade, and to provide a
remedy in its courts for a wrong of that kind even
though similar appropriation had previously
taken place in another state where no remedy was
available. And section 103-4-9 will be searched in
vain for any legislative intent or purpose to exclude from its remedial reach instances of exploitation in which the seal of privacy had already
been broken in another state where no relief could
be had under domestic law. The statute does not
provide that the heirs of a deceased relative may
maintain an action of this kind if the law of the
state where the seal of privacy was first broken
creates or recognizes such right of action and provides a remedy for its enforcement. It does not
contain any limitation or exception of that kind.
It is couc;tJ.ed in broad general language and indicates clearly a studied purpose on the part of the
legislature to create the right in heirs of a deceased person to maintain an action of this kind
for the violation of the right of privacy occurring
in that state, without regard to the law of another
state.'' (Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194
Fed. 2d 6, at 13.)
The conflict of laws rule to which the trial court is
apparently referring in its declaratory judgment is that
of the choice of law. Such a decision faees a forum in a
tort case in two, and only t"·o possible cir<'umstanres.
First, it may present itself where all of the eVPHts creating· the alleged liability occur \vithin one jurisrliction,
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but where the forum is a separate jurisdiction. Second,
it may present itself where the events creating the alleged
liability occur within more than one jurisdiction, and the
forum is either one of the jurisdictions in which these
events occurred, or in a third jurisdiction in which none
of the events transpired.
The former situation is the simpler of the two. Our
courts have held that in such situations, the court of the
forum will enforce rights and duties in accordance with
the la'v of the place where the tort occurred.
It is also clear that where the locus delicti and the
forum are identical, there is no question of a choice of
law, and thus no question of conflict of laws. This is the
case in the instant situation, and for purposes of a
declaratory judgment by this court interpreting the Utah
statute, is the case in any situation where the use of the
name, picture or portrait for purposes of trade occurs
within the State of Utah.
This case involves a publication within the State of
Utah allegedly contrary to the provisions of a Utah
statute. The only non-Utah elements in this case are
the facts that plaintiffs saw the picture in California and
are not Utah domiciliaries. Defendants stipulated that
the Utah shown picture was the same as the one seen
by plaintiff in California and plaintiffs testified that they
were informed of the Utah exhibition and of their reactions to the Utah showing. If the tort were committed
wholly within Utah, it is irrelevant where plaintiffs are
domiciled, unless this court shall find an express statutory
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the kind alleged in the amended complaint and to
provide a remedy in its courts, without regard to
whether like exploitation had previously occurred
in another state in which no like remedy was afforded. Utah was not powerless to prohibit appropriation in that state of the name or picture of a
person for purposes of trade, and to provide a
remedy in its courts for a wrong of that kind even
though similar appropriation had previously
taken place in another state where no remedy was
available. And section 103-4-9 will be searched in
vain for any legislative intent or purpose to exclude from its remedial reach instances of exploitation in which the seal of privacy had already
been broken in another state where no relief could
be had under domestic law. The statute does not
provide that the heirs of a deceased relative may
maintain an action of this kind if the law of the
state where the seal of privacy was first broken
creates or recognizes such right of action and provides a remedy for its enforcement. It does not
contain any limitation or exception of that kind.
It is couc;lJ.ed in broad general language and indicates clearly a studied purpose on the part of the
legislature to create the right in heirs of a deceased person to maintain an action of this kind
for the violation of the right of privacy occurring
in that state, without regard to the law of another
state.'' (Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194
Fed. 2d 6, at 13.)
The conflict of laws rule to which the trial court is
apparently referring in its declaratory judgment is that
of the choice of law. Such a decision faces a forum in a
tort case in two, and only t"'o possible circumstances.
First, it may present itself where all of the ev-ents creating the alleged liability occur within one jurisdirt ion,
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but where the forum is a separate jurisdiction. Second,
it may present itself where the events creating the alleged
liability occur within more than one jurisdiction, and the
forum is either one of the jurisdictions in which these
events occurred, or in a third jurisdiction in which none
of the events transpired.
The former situation is the simpler of the two. Our
courts have held that in such situations, the court of the
forum will enforce rights and duties in accordance with
the la'v of the place where the tort occurred.
It is also clear that where the locus delicti and the
forum are identical, there is no question of a choice of
law, and thus no question of conflict of laws. This is the
case in the instant situation, and for purposes of a
declaratory judgment by this court interpreting the Utah
statute, is the case in any situation where the use of the
name, picture or portrait for purposes of trade occurs
within the State of Utah.
This case involves a publication within the State of
Utah allegedly contrary to the provisions of a Utah
statute. The only non-Utah elements in this case are
the facts that plaintiffs saw the picture in California and
are not Utah domiciliaries. Defendants stipulated that
the Utah shown picture was the same as the one seen
by plaintiff in California and plaintiffs testified that they
were informed of the Utah exhibition and of their reactions to the Utah showing. If the tort were committed
wholly within Utah, it is irrelevant where plaintiffs are
domiciled, unless this court shall find an express statutory
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intent, separate and apart from the question of conflict of
laws, to limit the cause of action to Utah domiciliaries.
In deciding the existence of either of the two circumstances in which a choice of law question exists, one inevitably must make a decision as to the substantive
nature of the tort. First, if this court holds that "any
injury'' allows recovery for infringement of a property
right, as well as for injury to feelings, a point which is
argued in detail elsewhere in this brief, it is clear that
to the extent that the action is for said property damage,
that the locus of the injury is the place of publication.
Even without the existence of a property right, in
a case of Utah publication it is clear that no conflicts
question arises. The standard rule of choice of la'v in
questions of tort is to look to the ''place of wrong''.
~.,or purposes of convenience only, this place has been
defined as the state where the last event necessary to
make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place ( Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, A. L. I., Sec.
377). Under that section is the following comment:
''a. Each state has legislative jurisdiction to
determine the legal effect of acts done or events
caused within its territory (see sec. 64). If consequences of an act done in one state occur in another state, each state in which any event in the
series of act and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights or
other interests as a result thereof (see sec. 65).
Thus, both the state in which the actor acts and
the state in which legal consequences of his act
occur have legislative jurisdiction to impose an
obligation to pay for harm caused thereby. If any
state having legislative jurisdiction so to do im-
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poses a right-duty relation delictual in character,
other states will recognize the existence of such
relation under the rules stated in sees. 377 to 390.''
What is the last act necessary to execute this Utah
statutory right of action 1 For guidance, one may look
to certain common la'v privacy cases, where the right
has not been expanded by statute to include property
rights, as plaintiffs contend is the case here. American
Jurisprudence appears to give the answer cursorily. ''In
order to recover for an invasion of the right of privacy,
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege or to prove
special damages.'' ( 41 Am. J ur. 934, Sec. 11). If indeed
special damages were necessary, we would have at common law an unquestioned link with the feelings of the
heirs, and no action would lie without them. However,
such is not the case, and the tort of invasion of privacy
is completed and a cause of action lies upon the publication by defendant. Probably the most thorough analysis of the instant problem states : ''Since invasions of
privacy and defamation actionable per se cannot require
proof of special damage, the impact may be said to occur
when the wrongful idea has been made public or communicated to other persons.'' ( 60 H.L.R. 941, a.t 944).
Impact is more clearly defined earlier: ''Although the
word 'impact' is more conveniently used in referring to
interference with tangible interests since a physical
impact is readily observable, it may also be used to
describe the point of which there has been a sufficient
invasion of the intangible rights to create liability.''
(Ibid. p. 943, n. 23.) At page 947, the note refers to
''impact, the technical completion of the tort ... ''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

97

The Restatement comment after Sec. 377 shows that
the "last event" varies with the type o! tort involved.
Thus, where a person sustained bodily harm, the place
of wrong is the place where the harmful force takes effect
on the body. (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws, A.L.I., Sec. 377, Comment, Par. 1.) The restatement cites other types of tort, including poison, harm to
land or chattels and loss by fraud, all of which place
different rules as to the determination of the "last
event''. Significantly, paragraph five of the comment
of that section states :
''Where harm is done to the reputation of a
person, the place of wrong is where the defamatory statement is communicated.
''For example, A broadcasting in state X
slanders B. B is well and favorably known in
State Y and the broadcast is heard there by many
people conversant with B 's good repute. The
place of wrong is Y. ''
This does not expressly cover the right of privacy.
However, it is submitted that in picking a rule as to
choice of law, there is no question that an analogy from
the law of defamation is immensely superior to that of
physical personal injury.
The Restatement definition of the common law right
of privacy is ''a person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the
public is liable to the other.'' (Restatement of Torts,
Sec. 867.) Note that the actionable "yords are "known"
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and "exhibited". Of the actionable examples contained
in this section of the Restatement, each describes the
tort by the verb ''publishes'' or ''shows''. The sole
reference to plaintiff's feelings in this section is in the
comment ".,.here it is stated that "liability exists only if
the defendant's conduct was such that he should have
realized that it "-ould be offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities". (Restatement of Torts, Sec. 867, Comment
D, page 400.) This is a question of fact which makes no
reference to the actual injury to feelings of plaintiffs,
which is solely a question in the measure of damages,
once liability has been created. Whether defendant
should have realized the resulting offensive nature of
the act is not a question which should be guided by the
law of plaintiff's residence any more than by the law
of Tibet; it is in essence the test of reasonableness to be
applied as a limitation of the common law right created
in the place of publication.
Thus, the tort having been committed and tried in
one jurisdiction, the common law right of privacy would
create no conflicts of laws question in this case under
either of the two possible circumstances. One must then
ask, is this right restricted and confined to Utah residents by the statute now before this court~ It is clear
that this was certainly not the general intention of the
Legislature. It codified a right which at that time was
recognized in only a very few jurisdictions as a common
law right, thus, in effect, removing from the courts the
privilege of stating that such a right does not exist in
Utah. The legislature utilized almost word for word a
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statute just previously passed in the State of New York.
All of the significant variations from the New York
statute were changes which enlarged the scope of the
action. In the light of this, to uphold the trial court's
interpretation of the statute, this court must hold that
the words ' 'used within this state ' ' mean something different than commonly interpreted, or that one must find
a statutory intent to limit this right to Utah domiciliaries,
although there is no reference whatsoever to such a limitation.
As to the former argument, the statute clearly states
that one may ''maintain an action against'' a person ''so
using'', to restrain ''the use'' of a name for purposes
of trade ''within this state''. The statute further provides that a plaintiff may also recover damages for any
injuries sustained ''by reason of such use (within the
state)".
Clearly, an action to enjoin further use is here possible without reference to injury. Blumenthal v. Picture
Classics, 251 N.Y.S. 800, 235 App. Div. 570. To adopt
the trial court's interpretation, one would hold that a
suit under this statute for an injunction lies in Utah and
creates no conflict of laws question, and thus is actionable, while a suit for damages requires reference to the
place of injured feelings (in this case, California), and
thus is not actionable in Utah. To create two different
conflict of laws rules for the same substantive law, depending upon the type of relief sought is an absurdity.
Moreover, the uniqueness of Utah's statute makes it
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clear that in any action by out-of-state plaintiffs for a
Utah publication, if the forum must refer to any other
jurisdiction, the cause is effectively destroyed.
As to the latter argument, it is submitted that the
action .of the last legislature of this state makes its intention clear. A bill was introduced to amend the statute
in question to restrict recovery to those cases where the
person whose name is used, if deceased, died domiciled
in the state. Even this proposed amendment did not
restrict relief to heirs who are Utah domiciliaries (H.
B. 89 - 1953 Legislature). This bill was amended so as
to make this requirement less stringent, by providing
alternatively that action would lie if the decedent had
been a bona fide resident of Utah for twenty or more
years (House Journal, 51st day, page 18). Even as so
modified, this restrictive amendment failed of passage
by a roll call of 37 to 20. It is submitted that there can
be no more decisive evidence of a legislative intent to
resist any attempt to restrict relief under this statute
by use of the technique of domicile.
Such a restriction would not reasonably be inferred
from its absence, as the Virginia Legislature knew when
it expressly limited their privacy statute to the protection
of Virginia domiciliaries. Virginia Code, Section 5782
(Michie, et al., 1942).
It is submitted, therefore, that in any action brought
in a Utah court for damages resulting from a violation
of the statute by a publication in Utah, there is no probSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lem of choice of law. Reference need be made only to
the Utah statute.
POINTS 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17
THE EXPERT EVIDENCE HAD NO PLACE IN
THE CASE AND WAS ARGUMENTATIVE IN
NATURE.
Assuming that the value of the film for educational
purposes were a pertinent issue in a damage action for
use of the name for commercial purposes, which we deny
and have argued elsewhere in this brief, we submit that
the trial court improperly permitted the witnesses
Wheelwright, etc., in stating the reasons for their
opinions, to make, in effect, arguments to the jury as
to why no recovery should be had by plaintiffs in this
case, upon the false assumption that the use made by
defendants was educational in character. These witnesses
all sought to convey the impression that if plaintiffs
were to recover in this case that educational institutions
would be deprived of films of an historic or biographical
nature and that culture in this State would languish or
die as a result. Of course no such thing would follow
any more than it dies or languishes as a result of laws
relating to the privacy of living individuals or as a result
of copyright laws or those pertaining to trade names
and the names of living individuals "\\7hich have acquired
commercial value.
There is a very simple an~·nrer and it applies alikP
to the living and the dead so far as Utah is concernPcl.
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If you intend to use or exploit a name for trade or commercial purposes, obtain written permission so to do.
The requirement for obtaining permission is not unreasonable. It is no different from the law as it pertains
to other rights, personal and property. In fact this
statute is very similar in many respects to the copyright
J.a,v \Yhich protects man's mental creations against
piracy by another. It too survives to the benefit of the
widow and heirs and requires their permission for lawful use by another. The books are full of cases involving
attempted piracy of values created by one person and
attempted to be taken and exploited by another. The
copyright law is very jealous in its protection of those
rights; as is also the patent law in its protection of man's
mechanical genius. Why, then, should not the most sacred
right of all, one's good and valuable name, be a proper
subject matter for legislative consideration~ The courts
say that it is. The Supreme Court of the United States
so states in the Sperry Hutchinson case, hereinbefore
referred to. No amount of explanation by expert witnesses as to how the enjoyable or ''worth while use of
leisure time" is educational to all of us will save the
situation. It still comes back to the question in a damage
case, "What use was actually made~" If that actual use
was for trade purposes, that is what determines the
liability.
In this case the reasons for the op1n1ons a.s given
by the experts were argument and explanation, nothing
more; and on a point not involved in the issues for the
0

JUry.
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The extent to which the trial court permitted these
experts to go in their "reasons" for the opinions that
they gave is well evidenced by a reading of Dr. Wheelwright's evidence. It was argument, and nothing more.
The law books say that experts may give the reasons for
their opinion within reasonable limitations.
The trial court even permitted the witness Eaton
to testify that the word ''trade'' as used in the statute
does not comprehend the production of a play or movie.
This was a law question for the court, but it went in just
the same.
He also permitted the witness Haight to testify that
the movie had been approved by the L. D. S. Church for
showing in Ward Houses. This was wholly irrelevant
and hearsay, but it also went in.
It was all beside the real point in issue and had no
place in the case.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH AND ELTON
By H. A. Rich

Attorneys for Appellants
FABIAN, CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY
By Peter W. Billings

Associate Counsel for
Appella;n,ts on Brief

104
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

